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~xecutive Summary 
The Lessons-Learned in Peacebuilding Project has been an integral part of the work of 
the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee (CPCC) almost since that network was 
formed. A primary objective of the CPCC is to contribute to learning on peacebuilding in a 
systematic, strategic and focussed fashion that promotes shared analysis and enables the 
development of practical tools and best practices. The learning process thus includes as a critical 
component regular exchanges and dialogues among non-governmental organizations on the 
lessons that have been gathered from their work. Indeed, knowledge sharing and the 
identification of best practices have been and will continue to be the underlying purpose of the 
process. 
Phase I of the Lessons-Learned Project consisted of: the development of a peacebuilding 
typology; the drafting of a preliminary lessons-learned framework that included a rudimentary 
questionnaire; the establishment of a lessons-learned advisory group; and an initial cut at 
learning lessons by applying the questionnaire to case studies provided by CARE Canada, Inter . 
Pares and the Centre canadien d'etude et de cooperation internationale (CECI). This resulted in 
the preparation of a report submitted to the 1999 NGO-Government Consultations on 
Peace building. 
The second phase of the project was designed to take lessons learned about peacebuilding 
a step further by incorporating into the methodology field visits to the projects under review. 
The field visits were short, due to budget considerations, but included interviews with project 
on-ground personnel, recipients and partners. The intention has been to dig a little deeper 
beneath the surface than in the first phase in extracting lessons learned from peacebuilding 
projects. 
This report includes five case studies of peace building projects: 
• CARE Canada's Civil Society Strengthening Project in Bosnia. It looks at CARE's 
efforts to promote the development of civil society by focusing on women, youth and the 
elderly. Care believes that civil society is the bedrock of a stable democracy; 
• Rights and Democracy's (ICHRDD) Fund to Support Civil Society Policy Research in 
Guatemala. This Fund was intended to help Guatemalan organizations contribute to the 
implementation of the Peace Accords; 
• The .Centre canadien d'etude et de cooperation internationale (CECI), also m 
Guatemala; 
• The Canadian Institute for Conflict Resolution's (CICR) Conflict Resolution Training 
Project in Rwanda. This project was intended to train people at different levels in 
Rwandan society in conflict resolution methods, helping them avoid the resort to 
violence in conflictual situations; and 
• World Vision's Gulu Centre for the Rehabilitation of Child Soldiers, in Uganda. The 
Centre has been operating since 1995 providing rehabilitation services for former child 
soldiers. 
The CPCC learned many valuable lessons from this work. It learned, for instance: 
• That the time and resources provided by donors for peacebuilding projects rarely match 
the project's long-term requirements, with the result that projects often come to a close 
before their peacebuilding impact has been fully realized; 
• that youth, who are often more flexible than adults as well as open to new ideas and in 
favour of change, can be an important focus of peacebuilding, providing it with energy 
and sustainability; 
• that the process of building peace can sometimes be more important than achieving the 
stated goal of the project; the process brings people together and opens communication 
among them, giving them the sense of doing something that is meaningful, even if only 
in a small way; 
• that it is critical to involve local actors in every aspect of the peacebuilding process from 
project design to implementation; local people provide insight and knowledge that the 
outsider does not have; men, women, children, the elderly, different ethnic groups, etc., 
each of whom may have experienced the war differently and who will have unique 
perspectives to bring to peacebuilding, should be among those represented locally; 
• that flexibility in the field and on the part of the donors is a key ingredient in successful 
peacebuilding, allowing NGOs to adjust their projects and programs to particular needs 
and changing circumstances in the field; 
• that an organization with an exemplary history, solid reputation, and deep experience in a 
country will be well served by those characteristics when it turns to the task of building 
peace; and 
• that in peacebuilding it is not always possible (or smart) to be neutral. In Uganda, for 
instance, it was important that World Vision be seen as opposed to the Lord's Resistance 
Army, which is mainly responsible for victimizing children in that war. World Vision's 
opposition gave the children confidence. 
While these and other lessons-learned from. the case studies are valuable for those 
implementing projects in a peacebuilding environment, they are not necessarily generalizable 
and tell us very little about how these projects contribute to peacebuilding writ large. If we hope 
to engage in a comprehensive and ·meaningful approach to peacebuilding lessons learned, we 
will have to take account of the work that is being done at all levels in all spheres and how it 
relates to other work being done across and within levels. 
•• 
Resume 
Le projet Ler;ons tirees en matiere de consolidation de la paix fait partie integrante des travaux 
du Comite coordonnateur canadien pour la consolidation de la paix (CCCCP), depuis la creation 
du reseau OU presque. L 'un des principaux objectifs du CCCCP est de contribuer a l' education 
sur la consolidation de la paix d'une maniere systematique, strategique et ciblee, qui permette de 
faire la promotion des analyses partagees et qui permette de mettie au point des outils pratiques 
ainsi que des pratiques exemplaires. Le processus d'apprentissage inclut done, a sa base, un 
element primordial qui consiste en des echanges et un dialogue reguliers entre les organisations 
non gouvemementales au sujet des le9ons qu'elles ont tirees jusqu'a present, dans le cadre de 
leurs travaux. En effet, le partage des connaissances et !'identification des pratiques exemplaires 
sont et continueront d'etre la finalite sous-jacente de ce processus. La Phase I du projet Ler;ons 
tirees etait composee de plusieurs parties : !'elaboration d'une typologie de la consolidation de la 
paix; la redaction d 'un cadre de le9ons tirees preliminaire incluant un questionnaire 
rudimentaire; la creation d'un groupe consultatifsur les le9ons tirees; et une premiere evaluation 
des le9ons tirees en appliquaiit le questionnaire a des etudes de cas foumies par CARE Canada, 
Inter Pares et le Centre canadien d' etude et de cooperation intemationale (CECI). Tout cela a 
pennis de preparer un rapport soumis aux Consultations de 1999 entre les ONG et le 
gouvemement sur la consolidation de la paix. La Phase II du projet a ete con9ue de maniere a· 
pousser plus loin les le9ons tirees en matiere de consolidation de la paix en incorporant dans la 
methodologie utilisee des visites sur le terrain, la OU se deroulaient les projets a l'etude. Ces 
visites sur place ont ete courtes en raison des restrictions budgetaires, mais elles ont inclus des 
entrevues avec le personnel des projet sur le terrain, leurs beneficiaires et leurs partenaires. Ces 
activites avaient pour objectif d'aller un peu plus en profondeur que la premiere phase et d'aller 
chercher les le9ons tirees par des projets de consolidation de la paix.Le rapport en question inclut 
cinq etudes de cas de projets de consolidation de la paix :CARE Canada - Projet pour renforcer 
la societe civile en Bosnie. Cette etude examine les efforts deployes par CARE pour promouvoir 
le developpement de la societe civile en se concentrant sur les femmes, les jeunes et les 
personnes agees. Aux yeux de CARE, la societe civile est le point d'ancrage d'une democratie 
· stable. Droits et Derhocratie (CIDPDI) - Fonds pour la recherche en politiques sociales au 
Guatemala. Ce fonds a ete cree pour aider les organisations guatemalteques a participer a la mise 
en oeuvre des Accords de paix.Le Centre canadien d'etude et de cooperation intemationale 
(CECI), egalement au Guatemala. 
L 'Institut canadien pour la resolution des conflits (ICRC) - Projet de formation dans le. 
domaine de la resolution de conflits au Rwanda. Ce projet a ete con9u de maniere a former les 
gens faisant partie de differentes couches de la societe rwandaise pour leur apprendre des 
methodes de resolution de conflits et, ainsi, les aider a eviter d'avoir recours a la violence dans 
des situations conflictuelles; et Vision mondiale - Centre pour la readaptati,on des enfants-
soldats, a Gulu, en Ouganda. Le centre a ete cree en 1985 et il offre, depuis lors, des services de 
readaptation a l'intention d'anciens enfants-soldats. Ce travail a pennis au CCCCP de tirer de 
nombreuses le9ons. Parmi ces precieuses le9ons, on peut citer : Le temps et les ressources 
alloues par les donateurs dans le cadre des projets de consolidation de la paix sont trop souvent 
inferieurs aux besoins a long terme de ces pro jets. Par consequent, il n' est pas rare que ces 
projets prennent fin avant d'avoir pu pleinement atteindre leurs objectifs de consolidation de la 
paix. Les jeunes, qui sont souvent plus souples que les adultes, ouverts aux idees nouvelles et en 
faveur du changement, peuvent constituer un pilier important des operations de consolidation de 
la paix, apportant a ses demieres l'energie et la durabilite dont elles ont besoin. Le processus de 
consolidation de la paix peut parfois etre plus important que le fait d'atteindre l'objectif convenu 
d'un projet; le processus permet en effet de rassembler les gens et d'ouvrir les voies de 
·communications entre eux, ce qui leur donne !'impression de faire quelque chose de d'efficace et 
d'utile, meme s'il ne s'agit que de petites contributions. Il est primordial de faire participer les 
intervenants locaux a tous les aspects du processus de consolidation de la paix, de l' elaboration 
des projets a leur mise en oeuvre; les intervenants locaux apportent une connaissance 
approfondie que ne possedent pas les intervenants extemes; les hommes, les femmes, les enfants, 
les personnes agees, etc. ont tous vecu la guerre de fac;on differente et ils ont done une 
perspective des choses qui leur est propre. Ils peuvent tous contribuer a la consolidation de la 
paix et il devraient done etre represerites a l' echelle locale; La marge de manoeuvre dont on 
dispose sur le terrain et celle accordee par les donateurs est un element fondamental du succes 
des operations de consolidation de la paix. En effet, cela permet aux ONG d'ajuster leurs projets 
et leurs programmes en fonction des besoins particuliers et des circonstances changeantes 
prevalant sur le terrain; Une organisation quijouit d'antecedents exemplaires, d'une reputation 
solide et d'une experience approfondie dans un pays pourra se servir de ces caracteristiques 
lorsqu'elle devra s'engager dans des activites de consolidation de la paix; et Dans les projets de 
consolidation de la paix, il n'est pas toujours possible (ni meme intelligent) de rester neutre. En 
Ouganda, par exemple, il etait important que !'organisation Vision mondiale soit perc;ue comme 
etant opposee a la Lord's Resistance Army, laquelle est principalement responsable de la 
victimisation des enfants dans cette guerre. L'opposition de Vision mondiale a permis.de donner 
confiance aux enfants. Bien que les lec;ons que nous avons tirees des etudes de cas soient 
precieuses pour les personnes chargees de la mise en oeuvre des projets de consolidation de la 
paix, elles ne sont pas necessairement generalisables et elles ne nous en disent que tres peu sur la 
fac;on dont ces projets contribuent au mandat global en matiere de consolidation de la paix. Si 
nous desirons adopter une approche holistique et coherente a l' egard des lec;ons tirees dans ce 
domaine, nous devrons prendre en compte le travail qui s'effectue a tous. les niveaux et dans tous 






Learning lessons about peacebuilding is in vogue. Everyone seems to be doing it, 
international institutions, governments, universities, and, not least, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs). This is a good thing, of course. The more we learn about how to do 
peacebuilding properly, the better we will do it. This rather simplistic but important maxim 
underlies the work that the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee (CPCC) has 
devoted to leaning lessons in building peace. 
Since 1997, the CPCC a coalition of Canadian NGOs has been developing a 
methodology and framework for gathering lessons-learned from the experiences of non-
governmental organizations in peacebuilding. This work has been undertaken to support one of 
CPCC's primary objectives: to contribute to learning on peacebuilding in a systematic, strategic 
and focussed fashion that promotes shared analysis and enables the development of practical 
. tools and best practices. The learning process thus includes as a critical component regular 
exchanges and dialogues among non-governmental organizations on the lessons that have been 
gathered from their work so far. Indeed, knowledge sharing and the identification of best 
practices have been and will continue to be the underlying purpose of the process. 
Phase I of the lessons-learned project consisted of the development of a peacebuilding 
typology; the drafting of a preliminary lessons-learned framework that included a rudimentary 
questionnaire; the establishment of a lessons-learned advisory group; and the preparation of an 
interim report. 1 The latter included a synopsis of the work involved in testing and using the 
questionnaire to elaborate three case studies; it also included a review of other evaluation and 
lessons-learned experiences, which were used to assess and improve our own methodology. 
At each stage, workshops and roundtables were held to share the results of the work-in-
progress with the wider CPCC membership. The knowledge and lessons learned were presented 
to an informed and critical audience who could compare the information with their own 
experience and provide input to the development of the process and the advancement of lessons. 
In March 1999, at the Peace building Consultations, the results of the work were shared beyond 
the CPCC membership with a broader audience of government and NGO representatives, 
From the first phase of the project, the CPCC concluded · that the peacebuilding 
community is at a very early stage when it comes to learning lessons about peacebuilding. It 
also indicated to the CPCC that a true learning process needs to include beneficiaries and 
partners, and should incorporate learning from the work of organizations similar to those under 
scrutiny. The lessons, the CPCC concluded, should then be shared as widely as possible among 
the peace building community. · · 
In ·this,· the second phase of the project, the CPCC has advanced a more sophisticated 
methodology in order to extract more practical lessons by taking account of the opinions of 
1 CPCC, In Phase I of the learning project, the CPCC conducted documentary research 
and interviews with organizational personnel around three case studies provided by CARE 
Canada, the Centre d'etude et de cooperation internationale (CECI), and Inter Pares. 
partners, rec1p1ents, sponsors, and observers of peacebuilding programs. This phase of the 
project was designed to take lessons learned about peacebuilding a step further by incorporating 
into the methodology field visits to the projects under review. The field visits were short, due to 
budget considerations, but included interviews with project on-ground personnel, recipients and 
partners. The intention has been to dig a little deeper beneath the surface than "in the first phase 




What follows is a report of phase II of the Lessons-Learned project. It includes five case 
studies of peacebuilding projects: 
CARE Canada's civil society strengthening project in Bosnia, looks at ·cARE's efforts to 
promote the development of civil society by focusing on women, youth and the elderly. Care 
believes that civil society is the bedrock of a stable democracy. 
The International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development's (ICHRDD) Fund to 
Support . Civil Society Policy Research in Guatemala. This Fund was interided to help 
Guatemalan organizations contribute to the implementation of the Peace Accords. 
The Centre canadien d'etude et de cooperation internationale (CECI), also in Guatemala (at the 
time this report was submitted to IDRC, this case study was still being revised. It will be added 
to the report upon completion) 
The Canadian Institute for Conflict Resolution's (CICR) training project in Rwanda. This 
project was intended to train people at different levels in Rwandan society in conflict resolution 
methods, helping them avoid the resort to violence in conflictual situations; and 
World Vision's Gulu Centre for the Rehabilitation of Child Soldiers, in Uganda. The Centre has 
been operating since 1995 providing rehabilitation services for former child soldiers. 
Aside from the case studies, the report includes annexes on the methodology and work on 
lessons learned being done elsewhere.These annexes flag the methodology that the CPCC used 
in this its latest work on lessons learned. That methodology was an attempt to bring a more 
rigorous and sophisticated level of analysis to bear when conducting field studies about lessons 
learned. The overview of lessons learned is intended only to provide an example of what is 
going on elsewhere with the proviso that we may may want to do further, more detailed work in 
this area. 
The report concludes with some interesting findings regarding lessons learned by NGOs. 
But ultimately, it also illustrates how far we need to go if we want to elicit more meaningful 
lessons about how NGOs and their various counterparts in the peacebuilding endeavour can 
contribute, in the long run, to the building of peace. 
RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY'S 
FUND TO SUPPORT CIVIL SOCIETY POLICY RESEARCH FOR THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GUATEMALAN PEACE AGREEMENTS 




Global Affairs Research Partners 
CONTEXT AND BACKGROUND 
In May 1998, the International Centre for Human.Rights and Democratic Development -
-now known as Rights and Democracy -- (ICHRDD) established the Fund to Support Civil 
Society Policy Research for the Implementation of the Guatemalan Peace Agreements (the 
Fund). The general· purpose of the Fund was to help civil society organizations in Guatemala 
participate in the 1996 peace agreement ending the civil war in that country. 
In their submission to the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) seeking 
support for the project, ICHRDD referred to the urgent need for peacebuilding in Guatemala. 
The political culture of Guatemala is typical of a country that has been wracked 
by decades of internal strife: mutual intolerance is prevalent amongst the highly 
fragmented social and political actors, and effective public spaces are virtually 
. non-existent. In such an adverse political culture the highly unique framework of 
the implementation of the peace agreements provides a crucial but very isolated 
space for dialogue around concrete public policy issues affecting the general 
interest.2 
ICHRDD noted that most of the civil society organizations involved in the 
implementation of the peace agreements recognized that they were ill equipped to play the role 
expected of them. During the conflict, repression had decimated Guatemalan society, forcing 
many skilled ·people to leave and killing others. Therefore, civil society in general in Guatemala 
was limited in its capacity to translate its demands into concrete proposals and to use the 
political space available. 
The avowed purpose of the fund was to support the somewhat under-resourced sectors of 
Guatemalan civil society (e.g. organizations representing rural communities, the urban poor, 
displaced· populations) that were interested in the implementation of the Guatemalan peace 
accords. 
2 International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development. A Fund to SZ1pport Civil Society 
Policy Research for the Implementation of the GZ1atema/an Peace Agreements. A Proposal Presented to the 
Canadian Peacebuilding Fltnd. December 1997, p.1. 
The Accords 
The Guatemalan Peace Accords were signed in 1996, bringing an end to one of the 
longest wars in Latin American history. The accords, which established a framework for 
political transition and post-conflict reconstruction in Guatemala, were divided into three phases. 
The first phase saw the establishment of MINUGUA, an international verification mission, and 
the demobilization of armed opposition groups. The last phase involved the substantive 
implementation of the Accords, in law and practice, in the structure of the Guatemalan polity. 
But it was in the second phase that ICHRDD saw an opportunity. In this phase, eighteen 
Multipartite and Special Commissions were established under the Agreement on the Schedule 
for Implementation, Compliance, and Verification of the Peace Agreement. Eleven of the 
Commissions included representation from civil society organizations, primarily through the Co-
ordinating Forum for Indigenous Peoples of Guatemala (COPMAGUA), but also from numerous 
other social actors. It was these commissions that constituted what ICHRDD considered an 
entry point for the Fund, since they provided "formal spaces for dialogue and negotiation 
betWeen the Parties to the Accords and representatives of civil society organizations." 
ICHRRD'S FUND TO SUPPORT CIVIL SOCIETY INVOLVEMENT IN THE 
GUATEMALAN PEACE ACCORDS 
In this context the Fund was established in May 1998. As ICHRDD points out, the 
concept of the Fund originated out of several intensive· discussions on the Guatemalan peace 
process, including the Canadian Dialogue on Peacebuilding in Guatemala on October 9, 1997. 
Included in these discussions were Canadian NGOs and .Canadian government representatives. 
They were instigated at the behest of the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee and 
the Peacebuilding Division at the Department of Foreign Affairs and involved ICHRDD from 
the earliest stages. 
For its part, ICHRDD had long been a supporter of civil society participation in the 
process that led to the 1996 Accord in Guatemala: 
During this process ICHRDD observed that civil society organizations were in 
greater -need of support to respond to both the political imperatives of transition 
and the specific responsibilities assigned to them by the Agreement on the 
Schedule of Implementation, Compliance and Verification.3 
They concluded that the lack of technical and policy expertise and resources available to 
historically marginalized sectors of society seriously undermined their capacity to play an active 
role in the implementation process.4 Yet, after years of civil war characterized by violent 
3 ICHRDD, Fund for Public Policy Research in Guatemala. Interim Report, February 1999, p. I. 
4ICHRDD, A Proposal Presented to the Canadian Peacebuilding Fund, December 1997, p.2. 
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repression and exclusion from the political process, civil society in the post-conflict era now had 
both an opportunity and responsibility to play a role in the transition to peace. 
ICHRDD received $400,000 from the Peacebuilding Fund at CIDA to establish the Fund 
in Guatemala. The Fund, which was to operate for 16 months, granted money to civil society 
organizations engaged in the peace implementation process for short-term consultancies, 
background or policy research, surveys, and action research initiatives. The purpose of the Fund 
was to reinforce the ability of those civil society organizations participating ii:i the 
implementation and monitoring of the peace agreements to fulfil their obligations and 
commitments. To be eligible for the funds an organization had to be either directly participating 
in the commissions or indirectly participating through a representative. 
Objectives and Criteria 
ICHRDD hoped that the Fund would bridge what it saw as the gap between Guatemalan 
civil society's capabilities and responsibilities. It sought to improve Guatemalans' ability to 
engage in research and develop public policy proposals that would contribute to the peace 
process. More specifically, it gave priority to public policy research that is: 
• Related to the Multipartite and Special Commissions and other processes established 
under the terms of the Peace Accords; 
• conducted by civil society organizations working,· directly or indirectly, with the 
Commissions or other closely related processes; and 
• based on a broad process of consultation and diffusion of the findings of the research. 
In turn, preference would be given to projects that had the potential to: 
• Support processes of transition, particularly where these changes encourage the 
emergence of a new and democratic dynamic in the relationship between the Guatemalan 
State and civil society; and 
• contribute to the reform of State laws, policy and practice related to the issues identified 
within the Peace Accords; 
While one of the initial activities of the Fund Coordinator was to conduct a needs assessment in 
Guatemala, certain general needs were identified at the outset: 
• The need to help civil society organizations represented in the peace implementation 
·mechanisms develop concrete-:- sometimes highly technical proposals; 




• the need for material resources that would allow representatives of civil society 
organizations to participate in the implementation process on a more equal basis with 
government; and 
• the need to take the implementation process outside of the capital city and into the 
reg10ns. 
Peacebuilding in Guatemala 
While the particular purposes of the project were to support Guatemalan civil society' s 
ability to contribute to the implementation of the Accords by addressing their specific needs, the 
overarching purpose of the project was to contribute to peacebuilding. Indeed the project was 
conceived with peacebuilding in mind, as that was defined by the Department of Foreign Affairs 
and International Trade (DF AIT). The DF AIT definition states that peacebuilding is "the effort 
to strengthen the prospects for internal peace and decrease the likelihood of [future] violent 
conflict. The overarching goal of peacebuilding is to enhance the indigenous capacity of a 
society to manage conflict without violence." 
Noting that, as DF AIT admits, this definition is in some ways deficient, ICHRDD added 
depth to its understanding of the term by referring to the literature on peace building. It looked at 
the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee's (CPCC) definition, which elaborates on 
DFAIT's understanding by stating that peacebuilding is a means to achieve human security. 
CPCC also explicitly refers to the need to build peace in pre-, mid-, and post-conflict situations. 
Finally ICHRDD noted that NGOs and research institutes tend to consider peacebuilding a long-
term process, while the government usually interprets it as an 18-month window of opportunity. 
In coming to its own conclusions about peacebuilding, ICHRDD referred to the work of 
Necla Tschirgi, Ken Bush and John Paul Lederach .. While each elaborated on peacebuilding 
after their own fashion, ICHRDD identified three points in common that they used to inform the 
project in Guatemala. 
• First, peacebuilding initiatives must focus on enhancing the domestic capacity to manage 
and transform conflict; 
• second, peacebuilding is a dual process of building the confidence-relationships and 
process structures that strengthen and sustain peace initiatives over time, thereby 
avoiding a relapse into violent conflict; and 
• third, transition to democratic governance requires that the peace process must 
simultaneously work to dismantle enclaves of authoritarian power still present in the 
emerging polity. 
3 
ICHRDD determined that the Fund m Guatemala should be structured around these three 
essential components. 5 
FunCtioning of the Fund 
In the NGO and government discussion preceding the establishment of the Fund it was 
agreed that the Fund should be managed by an institution perceived as neutral and credible by all 
potential partners and observers, which meant that it could not be a Guatemalan institution. Nor 
could it be a Canadian institution with a history of strong involvement in Guatemala, though it 
should be an institution with a well-developed field knowledge of Guatemala, as well as a good 
understanding of research issues and methods, including participatory and action research. 
Several Canadian NGOs suggested that ICHRDD would be the logical candidate. Nevertheless, 
ICHRDD was determined that the project should be treated as a community initiative and not 
one that responds primarily to its own institutional agenda. 
ICHRDD hired a full time Canadian consultant based m Guatemala to act as Fund 
Coordinator. Reporting to the Americas Programme Officer at ICHRDD, the coordinator carried 
out a baseline needs assessment that included a survey of Canadian NGOs operational in 
Guatemala, civil society organizations involved in the peace commissions and mechanisms, 
international donors and Guatemalan research institutions. From this he proposed a detailed 
project design. 
The coordinator was responsible for managing the Fund; disseminating information 
about the Fund to interested organizations, and helping prospective applicants develop and 
implement their proposals. He was assisted by an Advisory Board whose members were 
representative of Guatemalan society and who were knowledgeable about research issues and the 
target sector for the fund. · 
The Fund itself strove to be flexible, responsive, and transparent, with a minimum of 
administrative requirements. Proposals to the Fund were evaluated on the criteria outlined above 
and on whether or not they: 
• Met basic academic and technical standards for research (the Fund would also consider 
providing academic and technical support to civil society organizations involved in 
policy development); and 
• involved participatory research methods that could lead to the development of public 
policy proposals within the framework established by the Peace Accords. 
Three specific thematic areas were identified for support: land reform; reforms to the 
political system; and the status of women. In these areas the Fund· sought to ensure that the 
5 David Gairdner, Fund for Public Policy Research in Guatemala Programme Evaluation. Evaluation 
Framework. October 1999. 
4 
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themes of proposals were of historic importance, that is to say they addressed issues at the centre 
of past civil conflict and the implementation of the peace accords. The Fund also looked for the 
following conditions when considering funding: 
• Social organizations that have some capacity to negotiate and conduct related policy 
research and have meaningful representation within the peace negotiations through the 
commissions and other related processes; 
• a high-level of government participation within the negotiations, ensuring substantive 
contact between social organizations, the State, and in some cases the private sector; and 
• a unique role for the Fund that did not duplicate the work of other international donors in 
these areas. 
Other important issues that were identified included: 
• Education and follow up to the report 'bf the Multipartite Commission on Education 
Reform; 
• judicial reform and follow up to the report of the Special Commission on Strengthening 
the Judicial System 
• follow-up by social organizations to the report and recommendations of the Truth 
Commission for Guatemala; and 
• fiscal policy, especially in relation to tax reform. 
The Fund was designed with a specific set of social actor applicants in mind. These 
applicants had to be involved in the peace negotiations either directly through the commissions 
or indirectly through related processes. They had to be non-governmental, non-profit 
Guatemalan organizations or institutions that could contribute 20 per cent of the cost of research 
from its funds. They had to have the experience and administrative capacity to implement the 
project and previous experience with the issue. 
The Fund Coordinator was responsible for receiving and processing project applications. 
He made the initial assessment of each application, rejecting those that fell outside the fund' s 
criteria. The organizations that had submitted more promising and viable proposals were 
provided with the necessary technical support required for further consideration, The revised 
projects were then presented to the Advisory Committee, which either recommended approval of 
the project as submitted, or with specific conditions; rejected the project; or asked for more 
information or specific changes to the project based on suggestions provided by the Advisory 
Committee. The Fund manager then presented approved projects to ICHRDD for a final 
decision. 
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The Fund began operating only after the manager had conducted an initial needs 
assessment, which he submitted to ICHRDD on June 30 1998. That assessment included 50 
interviews with Guatemalan social organizations and individuals, government officials and 
representatives of the international community. This study was used to determine program 
criteria, Fund materials, thematic foci and methodology. 
The needs assessment contributed to the development of a management plan based 
around four project cycles that set final submission dates for applications to the Fund: October 
29, 1998, November 27, 1998, January 28, 1999, and March 31, 1999. The Fund formally began 
operation on September 9, 1998. The manager disseminated information about the fund to all 
potential partners in a transparent and timely manner. 
That information consisted of a mail-out of Fund materials to potential counterparts, 
three public information sessions in late September, early October and additional meetings with 
organizations unable to attend the ·information sessions. The Fund manager also met 
individually with the representatives of 17 organizations to discuss the Fund. 
LESSONS LEARNED 
Lesson 1: Critical to the success of any peace building enterprise is donor experience in and 
knowledge about the country, people and region in which it is about to be engaged. Knowledge 
. and analysis prepares the donor for the task ahead and for the issues involved, and experience 
helps them to develop a level of trust among the people they will be dealing with. 
One of the rarely mentioned but implied lessons of the Fund in Guatemala is the benefit 
that ICHRDD's experience in the cotlntry, dating back to 1991, provided in carrying out the 
project. Only a few of the interviewees commented on the well-established relationship between 
themselves and ICHRDD working on issues of human rights and the consolidation of peace. 
Nevertheless, this relationship established a basis of trust and comfort that helped ICHRDD 
implement the Fund quickly within its short time span and perhaps mitigated, in the eyes of the 
recipients, some of the fund's shortcomings. 
ICHRDD, too, benefited from the knowledge both it and the Canadian community in 
general had gained from their long experience in Guatemala. Institutionally, ICHRDD has been 
deeply engaged since 1992 in analysis and policy work around Guatemala. It has also been 
involved in the consultative group on Guatemala since . 1992 as well as a democratic 
development study on the country and Forum 96. As an ICHRDD official explained, this is a 
country where there has been significant analytical investment by many actors, especially since 
1994-95, and the. cumulative effect is a significantly enhanced capacity to generate good 
proposals. The lesson here may be that the collective fabric of analysis on the country here in 
Canada is an important factor for success in peacebuilding projects.6 
6 Comments by Nancy Thede, Coordinator, ICHRDD. 
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Lesson 2: The limited resources available for peacebuilding projects mean that donors must 
consider time as a factor in peace building. More precisely, they need to consider that while 
peacebuilding is usually a long-term undertaking, the projects that they seek to implement will 
only be funded for a relatively short term. Peacebuilders, then, need to design projects that can 
have an impact beyond their own lifetime not least by including as a component capacity-
building for local individuals and institutions. Furthermore, they would be wise to engage with 
their partners in developing a follow-up strategy for the project that allows for extending the 
· project through local means or parlaying its impact beyond the period of the donor's 
commitment. 
The most glaring shortcoming of the Fund, commented on by both the implementers and 
many recipients, was the contradiction between the short time CIDA allowed for the project and 
the long-term requirements of peace building. One member of the Advisory Committee advised 
that the error regarding time was an important lesson for the project. He noted that more time 
. would have allowed the Fund to take shape more fully. He also pointed out that the Fund was 
designed to respond to the need to implement the Peace Accords, but that that need outlasted the 
Fund and continues even today. Furthermore, increasing the capacity for dialogue between the 
State and Civil Society takes more time than the Fund allowed. 
Even a Canadian official acknowledged that a shortcoming of the project was that it was 
short term rather than long term. While the Fund did manage to enhance the capacities of many 
of the recipients, perhaps more durable impacts would have been forthcoming from a longer 
project. The official did not blame ICHRDD for this but rather pointed to CIDA's reduced 
budget and the nature of the project as a pilot project. 
Lesson 3: It is important that peacebuilding projects, as far as possible, benefit from local input 
every step of the way. Local input will help to complement the knowledge and analysis of the 
donor organization and dispel any impression of peacebuilding imperialism. It will also help to 
ensure that local capacities for peacebuilding are developed. 
An important aspect of the Fund was the Advisory Committee, which was made up of 
prominent Guatemalan civil society representatives. This committee not only helped vet the 
proposals but also, in cases where this was needed, made helpful suggestions to the authors for 
their final submission. They also helped local organizations identify areas in Guatemalan civil 
society that needed work, for instance in the development of local research capacities. This, in 
tum, contributed to sustainability since that work is critical to the creation of a viable civil 
society. The Fund also benefited from the advice of Guatemalans who were knowledgeable 
about the local situation and particular needs. In tum, it enabled many of them to learn about 
issues about which they previously knew nothing. As a representative of the Advisory 
Committee noted, her involvement on the committee not only helped her to learn about different 
issues, such as taxes, but about the different realities of the country. 
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Local input and involvement is also a way to sustain, in some way, the project beyond its 
lifetime. A number of interviewees commented on the relationships that were estabiished as 
· well as on what they learned about research and project development through their participation 
in the project. These relationships and skills will be useful in carrying on local peacebuilding in 
the future. 
Lesson 4: It is important to ensure that the project is as inclusive as possible of the community it 
seeks to work with. But the challenge for any peacebuilding project is the need to balance that· 
inclusiveness against a limited time frame, internal coherence, and finite resources for the 
implementation of a project. That balance must be struck in cognizance of the need to achieve a 
demonstrable impact. Implementers of peacebuilding projects will need to strategize carefully 
about what they hope to achieve and leave behind after the project ends. They can only do this 
to the best of their ability, however, and in recognition that the proper scope for a project and an 
assessment of its impact will always be challenged by somebody somewhere. Those challenges 
are not to be feared, however, but welcomed as part of the critical analysis that should follow 
any project. 
The Fund was partly intended to increase the ability of Guatemalan civil society 
organizations to contribute to the formal peace process in Guatemala. As a result, its criteria 
stipulated that projects, for the most part, should be linked to the various commissions involved 
in the peace accords. Some interviewees felt that this cast the net too narrowly, excluding access 
by tho.se organizations not involved with the commissions. Similarly, one interviewee noted that 
many economic issues, such as public spending and taxes, were not completely addressed by the 
Fund. Others also worried that much of the research generated was not adequately linked to 
policy development. 
There was also a suggestion that the Fund would have benefited from a closer association 
with the Guatemalan government through the Peace Secretariat. The Peace Secretariat was the 
government body in charge of implementing and monitoring the peace accords. 
Again, the tight time frame for implementing the project may have had a. bearing on the 
scope. With little time to prepare and organize, the Fund was bound to define its parameters 
narrowly in the interest of efficiency. Even then it was felt that the Fund was too much for one 
person to undertake. It was noted that, as a result, the Fund had difficulty making an impact and 
disseminating results. 
Lesson 5: Nearly any peacebuilding project should have either as its direct aim, or an indirect 
byproduct, the building of communication among disparate local groups that are crucial to the 
building of peace in a society, whoever they may be, whether government actors, former 
opponents, or civil society organizations. 
The Fund was established within a context of mistrust between civil society institutions 
and the State, and often among civil society organizations themselves. By linking projects to the 




served as a channel of communication, helping to build "confidence relationships" among these 
various actors. 
Lesson 6: Peacebuilding projects must address gender issues if they expect to be successful. No 
project can hope to have a lasting impact if it has not considered in its undertakings the different· 
gender needs in any society -- male and female children, adults, and the elderly -- and how to 
address them. 
The Fund only received one project related to indigenous women, which failed to achieve 
funding. However two women were included on the Advisory Committee and one of them noted 
that her participation built confidence in the Fund on the part of indigenous women, especially in 
the area of consultation where women are not well represented. Still, she felt that the Fund 
resulted in very little attention to women in Guatemala, especially Mayan women. This leaves 
an important component of Guatemalan society excluded. There may be valid reasons for this, 
but if so they need to be analyzed and understood. As one of the interviewees noted, more 
women could have been targeted for inclusion in the project and each project should have been 
asked to include a gender perspective. · 
Lesson 7: Similar to the above lesson, diversity is important. No society is homogenous, so it is 
important that as far as is reasonable no group is left out of the project, which might create 
resentment on their part and obstacles to the overall success of the project. 
One of the interviewees lauded the diversity of the ICHRDD project, which was 
manifested in the makeup of the Advisory Group and the tendency. of the fund to reach into 
different sectors. This diversity contributed to a diverse and multifaceted dialogue and a rich 
learning experience for everyone involved. Still, it will be impossible to be all-inclusive in most 
projects, so priorities and criteria need to be established at the outset. 
Lesson 8: In many ways, timing of the project and the particular entry point chosen for 
peacebuilding will determine the kind and extent of its impact. This goes to the importance of 
pre-project analysis to determine the situation in the field, the various issues that need to be 
taken into consideration (e.g. gender), and the peacebuilding needs and. requirements. 
It goes without saying that, as one of the interviewees noted, the Fund was established at 
a critical period for the country when the peace accords were being negotiated in the Parity 
Commissions. The Fund allowed civil society organizations to contribute to, and have an impact 
on that process. While the Fund itself was a one-off enterprise, it kick-started a process that 
could have effects even after the Fund ceased to exist. Research and proposal writing skills were 
developed among civil society organizations, which could then use these skills in their future 
· work and pass them on to others. In this sense the Fund had a multiplier effect, allowing 
organizations to develop skills that they could then use to seek support for other projects from 
other donors. For instance, one interviewee pointed out that the support of the Fund made it 
possible for the University of San Carlos to get funding from the International Development 
Research Centre for two other projects. 
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Some of the projects had policy implications. As one of the interviewees noted, the fund 
proposals served as instruments for negotiations within the framework of the Parity Commission. 
rt was used as a base for indigenous organizations in their demands for the recognition of Mayan 
rights and for obtaining a multi-ethnic justice system. The Fund was a key actor for the 
continuation of the project of the Association for the Advancement of Social Sciences 
(AV ANCSO) on the situation of education in Guatemala. 
So, while the Fund itself was never intended to be sustainable, the timing of the 
enterprise and the selection of the entry point enabled the Fund's immediate impact to 
reverberate in Guatemala beyond its lifetime, the critical point being that it focussed on capacity-
building among the Guatemalans themselves. 
It is important to note, nevertheless, that while this result was welcome among the 
interviewees, most of them still felt that the Fund should have had a second phase. Short-term 
projects in situations where the peace process is likely to be of extended duration can leave 
participants with the impression of a job half-done. Similarly, results attained can be lost if 
continued local or international support and action do not bolster them. For instance, while the 
work of AV ANCSO was greatly aided by the FUND, which its representative stated was 
established at a crucial period for the organization, he larpented the fact that it was a short-term 
project, .quickly realized and nearly as quickly finished. 
Lesson 9: Try to avoid overlap, but if that is not. possible cooperate to maximize the benefits of 
it. 
It may be that a certain amount of project overlap in peacebuilding is unavoidable, what with the 
scramble· to do· peacebuilding by a wide variety of Canadian organizations with the similar 
institutional foci, many of whom will inevitably submit project proposals to different funders for 
work in the same country. Unless this overlap is productive (which is not entirely impossible in 
a country with needs in a certain area too large for any one organization to handle) it should be 
avoided, or at least managed in a way that is mutually beneficial both to the donors and the. 
recipients. This means, at the very least, constructive communication among the donors, if not 
outright cooperation or collaboration. 
There was some concern expressed on the part of one interviewee that the ICHRDD Fund 
and the Fund for Democratic Development (FDD) run by CECI overlapped in that both projects 
were political and aimed at promoting research. Moreover, cooperation between the two 
projects was somewhat lacking. The interviewee felt that part of the problem lay in the fact that 
both the ICHRDD Fund Coordinator and the people responsible for running the FDD were too 
overwhelmed with their own work. 
In spite of this overlap, it was pointed out that the Fund did address specific issues that 
other projects in Guatemala did not, especially in the area of citizen participation in politics 








and particular institutions. In general, it should be noted that the Fund had more specific 
objectives than did the FDD. 
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CONFLICT RESOLUTION TRAINING IN RWANDA 
INTRODUCTION 
A Case Study of 
LESSONS LEARNED 
by 
Jean-Fran~ois Rioux, PhD 
Global Affairs Research Partners 
Conflict resolution training is a well-known peacebuilding activity. Several Canadian 
organizations are disseminating this type of knowledge throughout the world, an enterprise that 
is endorsed by the Government of Canada. The general rationale behind this effort is that the 
spread of conflict resolution techniques can help··some people settle their differences before they 
resort to violence. Conflict resolution training is also a means to improve the work effected by 
public and private institutions. This training seems necessary in a society like Rwanda, tqrn by 
war and genocide. Such conflict resolution training could be especially important where Hutus 
and Tutsi interact on daily. 
The Canadian Institute for Conflict Resolution (CICR) located at Saint-Paul University in 
Ottawa has been training people in Rwanda since 1997, first in a pilot project then by a two-year 
project, both funded by the Canadian International Development agency (CIDA). This report 
aims at identifying the main challenges faced by the project managers in Rwanda and how they 
attempted to resolve them. 
It is important to note that the CICR does not have long international aid experience, 
unlike some of the other NGOs studied in this report. Therefore, some of the lessons that they 
learned may not seem remarkable to some experienced aid workers. However, the lessons 
gathered by the CICR are very instructive of the difficulties faced by small and relatively 
inexperienced Canadian organizations operating abroad. 
THE CONTEXT 
The Rwandan genocide was the worst the world has seen since the Holocaust. However, 
it was not the first time that mass murder occurred in this little country of 7 million, or in its 
neighbour Burundi.7 Two tribal groups, the Hutus and the Tutsis, have been rivals in these 
1 One of the most objective sources on Rwandan history was prepared by the National University of Rwanda and is 
entitled Comprehending and Mastering Conflicts: The Case of the Genocide in Rwanda: Genesis, Consequences and 
Action Proposals, Butare, 1998. 
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countries for centuries. When the Tutsis first arrived from the northeast in the Xllth or XIVth 
century, the Hutus resented them and tried to limit their deployment in the Kingdom. However, 
the Tutsis prospered in cattle raising, then in crafts and trade, until some achieved prominent 
positions near the King of Rwanda. During their colonization of the region, from 1918 on, the 
Belgians selected the Tutsis as the tribe that couid best manage the local administration and 
commerce, and saw that they received the best ec;lucation and promotions in the country. After 
independence in 1962, the Hutus, wanting to gain more space in the public life of the country, 
tried to displace .the Tutsis from their dominant position, through intimidation, discrimination, 
and outward violence. Massacres of Tutsis, usually engineered by Hutu mass movements, 
occurred notably in 1959, 1963, 1973 and 1990. The Tutsis sometimes responded in kind to 
those massacres, carrying out abuses of their own. Meanwhile, the situation became gradually 
untenable for the Tutsis in Rwanda. Masses of them, now excluded from higher education and 
employment, and subjected to ill treatment, fled the country to settle in Uganda, Zaire, Burundi, 
and Tanzania, and in Europe, North America and West Africa 
In 1990, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) launched an offensive against Rwanda from 
its bases in Uganda. The relations between Uganda and Rwanda became very tense. Negotiations 
among the two countries led to the Arusha accords of 1992; which stipulated the deployment of 
observers from the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in the north of Rwanda. Problems 
continued and in June of 1993, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) voted resolution 
846 requesting ·the creation of a UN Mission in Uganda and Rwanda. In August that year, new 
peace accords were signed in Arusha, and in October, the UNSC created the UN Mission in 
Rwanda (MINUAR) under resolution 872. 
In the meantime, Hutu mass organizations started to plan again for new acts of 
intimidation and revenge against the Tutsi. The violence erupted after the assassination of the 
Presidents of Rwanda and of Burundi at Kigali international airport on April 6, 1994. Hundred 
· of thousands of Tutsis were killed in a frenzy of barbaric murders that lasted until June. The 
murderers, encouraged by mass organizations, politicians, intellectuals and religious leaders, 
also killed many moderate Hutus who advocated peaceful coexistence with the Tutsis. In all, at 
least eight hundred thousand people perished. The MINUAR, an overmatched peacekeeping 
contingent, was unable to stop what the full-fledged genocide. 
The exiled Tutsis rapidly mobilized their army and invaded Rwanda in May. They took 
power in Kigali, while the French were putting together Operation Turquoise intended to create a 
no-kill zone in the south west of the country. Thousands of Hutus involved in the genocide fled 
to Zaire, but were subjected to death by starvation, thirst, disease, and attacks from Tutsis. 
Several tens of thousands, and perhaps hundred of thousands, perished there. The Hutus left in 
Zaire (now Congo) even now hope to re-enter the country to establish their rule, supported by 
the Kinshasa government and by local tribes. 
In Rwanda, the government, composed mostly of formerly exiled Tutsis, has been busy 
re-establishing law and order, and reconstructing their country. It did not take long for the 
country to return to a state of quasi-normalcy. However, the government still pursues efforts to 
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bring to justice the people responsible for the genocide. While some have been judged and 
condemned by the International Tribunal on War Crimes or by Rwandan courts, many mass 
murderers are still living abroad. Several killers and their accomplices still live in Rwanda, and 
efforts to bring them to justice are under way, notably through the use of local courts and 
traditional means of atonement. 
THE CICR PROJECT 
The CICR, located at Saint-Paul University in Ottawa, and headed by Dr Vern Redekop, 
is a reputed centre of training in conflict resolution. The CICR has developed its own 
methodology for conflict resolution, based on the learning and experience of modem psychology 
and management science, but also on teachings from the Western Christian tradition, oriental 
religions, and North American aboriginal cultures. The CICR trains Canadians, as well as people 
from diverse countries, at different levels. 
The CICR's main training courses are called TPN (Third Party Neutral) and are taught at 
four levels. Low level courses are usually taught in a one-week format or less, while advanced 
· programs, notably to train new trainers, are longer. The purpose of these courses is to develop 
capacities for conflict resolution and, more generally, spread a culture of harmony within 
communities, workplaces, and families. The emphasis is on mediation, as the trainees from the 
CICR are taught to act as neutral third parties in the event of disputes. 
In 1997, the CICR received a one-year grant from.CIDA for a pilot.project in Rwanda. 
The objective was to train a small contingent of Rwandan people in conflict resolution and to 
evaluate whether it was possible to sustain this effort over time. The pilot project was successful, 
the CICR having identified many organizational and individual partners and having trained a few 
dozen people. CICR thus received another grant from CIDA for a two-year project in 1998-2000. 
This more ambitious project was intended to set up a more permanent training structure in 
Rwanda. The CICR aimed to train a group of 28 Rwandans at the highest level, so that they 
could in tum train hundreds of their co-citizens and also establish a conflict resolution training 
centre in Rwanda. To accomplish these goals, the CICR had to train a large number of Rwandans 
at levels TPN-1 and -2 to further assess the applicability of their conflict resolution model, to 
· recruit future trainers, and to provide practice to their new trainers. In the following section, we 
will summarize the activities of the CICR in this second phase and highlight the lessons that it 
learned in the process. 
ACTIVITIES OF THE PROJECT 
The main activities of the project were to train a core of trainers who would in tum train 
many Rwandans at low, medium, and high levels of proficiency in conflict resolution. The 
project also involved training a large number of Rwandans from all walks of life in the basics of 




become self-sustaining. The project also intended to spread general knowledge of the benefits of 
conflict resolution among decision-makers and the wider population. 
High-Level Training 
The CICR's goal was to certify 28 trainers who could eventually train other Rwandans at 
any level of the TPN program. While the CICR was quite successful with its program at the 
lowest level of training( see next section), it managed to train only 8 of a target 28 trainers. 
There are several reasons for this, including unforeseen difficulties in identifying 
potential trainers and keeping them in the project. The time frame of the project was too short to 
allow for an extensive search and follow-up of trainers. The problems encountered by the CICR 
in setting up a permanent office in Rwanda also compounded the problem. 
. The first 8 trainers were trained in Ottawa, which was quite expensive. This choice of 
location was inspired by the fact that the CICR did not have an institutional partner in Rwanda at 
the time. Nevertheless, subsequent trainers were supposed to be instructed in Rwanda. Aside 
from high costs, there are reasons why the training in Ottawa was complicated. Some Rwandans 
could not obtain a visa for Canada, as the Canadian government feared that they might want to 
stay in Canada. During the training, some Rwandans openly considered asking for asylum in 
Canada, but were convinced to return home. However, one of them eventually stayed in Canada. 
The CICR has learned that training people here can be a source of trouble, but the initial course 
for Rwandan trainers went generally well, as evidenced by the high level of satisfaction 
demonstrated by the new trainers. 
In the two years since this training took place, only 4 of these trainers have been certified 
by the CICR, meaning that they are certified to issue training diplomas at all levels and also to 
train other trainers8• The explanations for this state of affairs constitute a good illustration of 
lessons learned by an organization operating in developing countries after a prolonged war. 
The CICR has found that it is more difficult and expensive than expected to train and 
support the trainers. The CICR finds it hard to convince people to devote the time and effort to 
complete a trainer's program while they are trying to earn a living in a poor country. Many 
Rwandans, even among the elite, need two jobs to make ends meet. Even if their employers 
were to pay them to train with the CICR, the trainees would still need their moonlighting 
earnings. Furthermore, there is the risk that because they will be attending to their jobs the 
trainees will miss many sessions during their training,. Therefore, the CICR may have to pay 
people to attend the. lengthy program, which could be expensive, and would entail risks such as 
attracting people who would not have vested interests in the project. 
8 To be certified a person must have 1) attended one training session as an observer, 2) assisted another 





The CICR also found that completing the apprenticeships required much more 
supervision than expected. Furthermore, since the new trainers are already employed, 
completing their apprenticeships on a part-time basis is an extended process. A local structure 
blessed with people and means could allow for follow-up with the new trainers, keeping them 
. interested in and current with developments in conflict resolution. However, as we will see later, 
the CICR project does not have such a facility. 
The CICR learned that, as a rule, to certify a given number of trainers, it should train two 
to three times that number, as lack of competence and attrition take their toll. 
Low-Level Training. 
In 1998-2000, in the second phase of the project, the CICR and its local partners trained 
over 700 people from more than 50 organizations at the TPN-1 level. Therefore, for the 1st level 
of training, the CICR has met and even surpassed its goals, even while it does not have as many 
focal trainers as was planned at the onset of the project (see next section). The CICR learned that 
low level training can be done on a wider scakthan expected when participating organizations 
are eager to send large sections of their personnel. The relatively low unit cost of training in 
Rwanda, as compared to Canada,is another factor favouring extended beginners_ training. 
The recruitment of trainees by the CICR has been done mostly through contacting major 
institutions in Rwanda and offering to dispense the course to their employees and partners. The 
main organizations where the training took place were the Caisse sociale du Rwanda, a state 
fund; the R_seau des femmes pour le d_veloppement rural, a women rural solidarity 
organization; the Danish Centre for Human Rights, an organization that trains many Rwandan 
para-legals; and the University of Rwanda, the country's main post-secondary institution, located 
in Butare, where the CICR's main local partner is located. Other institutions where people have 
been·trained were the Gendarmerie Nationale, the CESTRAR trade union, and Save the Children 
(U.K.). 
The CICR's trainer from Ottawa, Mr. Richard Batsinduka, has taught a large number of 
these people, but gradually, some of the local trainers have become very active, mainly at the 
University of Rwanda and in the R seau des femmes. This involvement of local trainers has been 
quite successful in terms of meeting the numerical goals of the project. However, the CICR now 
feels that it will have to go beyond the organizations to which it has been providing training up 
to now, in order to maximize the effect of this training on Rwandan society as a whole. 
One question that has bedeviled the CICR is whether or not to compensate the people 
being trained. This question inevitably arises for those training people in the developing world? 
Rwandan has been no exception. Several Rwandans have asked for compensation to attend the 
courses. The CICR has decided upon a policy of disbursing money only for expenditures 
incurred by. the trainees. This has limited the costs and ensured that some of those interested only 
in money are kept at bay. However, this policy has limits. As the project progresses, it is possible 
that more pe9ple will hear about it and start clamoring for compensation, making it increasingly 
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difficult to provide the teaching· without a stipend. Another tricky issue is that some people may 
demand opportunity cost compensation for training, claiming that it robs them of time for 
moonlighting. 
In order to avoid a cost explosion caused by compensation demands, the CICR resolved 
to cater to public institutions and large NGOs whose members could be expected not to request 
compensation for receiving courses. This has worked so far, but the strategy has its limits in that 
it tends to restrict training to the elite strata of society. Also, potential trainees must be 
interviewed in order to assess if their expectations about the course are realistic. 
Establishing a Sustainable Local Structure 
Critical to the project were the establishment of a sustainable structure in Rwanda that 
would serve as a communication node, an information provider, and a centre of training. At first, 
the CICR proposed joining with another foreign NGO, but the arrangement was never realized as 
the prospective partner's attention was focussed on other issues. The CICR also discussed this 
matter with other foreign NGOs but most were interested only if long term financing were 
available. 
Eventually, the CICR created a Centre for Conflict Resolution at the National University 
of Rwanda, in Butare, about a hundred kilometres from Kigali. The Centre has beeri established 
through an agreement signed with the university. Mr. Runyange, the former head of Human 
Resources at the university, who is paid in part by the university and in part by the CICR, directs 
it. It took some tirrie to establish the Butare Centre. but in the last months of the CICR project, 
the centre has been quite active in training people on the campus.· However, it has been less 
successful in gathering people from outside the captive university market. Also, it has not yet 
found monies to sustain its activities other than what was already contributed by the CICR and 
by the university. 
A major obstacle in this regard is that the CiCR-supported Centre is in competition for 
the attention of foreign sponsors and university administrators with another conflict resolution 
centre at the university. The other centre is a multidisciplinary academic organization led by 
professors and professional researchers, which has been directly sponsored by the UNDP. The 
position of university officials in this matter was disconcerting, as they pretended that the two 
centres were complementary and that they could coexist, even within the restricted confines of a 
small university. However, in practice, the two centres did not talk much to each other. For the 
representatives of donor organizations, this duplication was debatable, ·and they generally 
favoured merging the centres. The CICR are now considering int~grating their centre with the 
UNDP-sponsored institute. 
The CICR project did not have a formal structure in the capital city of Kigali. This 
created problems of coordination, of reach, and of follow up, notably, as most of the trainers, 
trainees, partners, sponsors and potential clients of the CICR live in Kigali. Mr. Runyange went 
to Kigali sometimes, but his main responsibility was at the university. The Canadian-based 
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CICR trainer went to Rwanda for only a few weeks each year. These intermittent presences of 
the CICR could not match the action of a true local representative. 
A Rwandan trainer could have been asked to take over the role of representative, but 
most of these people work for organizations that are already busy and it is dubious that any of 
them would find the time to act as a representative in Rwanda. There is also a problem of 
possible rivalry and envy among the trainers if one of them was chosen to represent the CICR in 
Kigali. Alternatively, another partner of the CICR might have been interested in hosting the 
project, but there have been no negotiations on this. Perhaps an officer from a Canadian 
organization interested in conflict resolution should be asked to provide some services of 
coordination for a reasonable amount of compensation. 
The CICR has learned that in this type of training project, the presence of a reliable 
representative in the capital city is crucial. This, again, shows how much the choice of partners 
matters in any foreign aid project. .. 
Networking 
The CICR has worked at establishing a network of local NGOs to stimul£!.te the teaching 
and practice of conflict resolution training. Currently, it has created an embryonic network, 
mostly composed of organizations whose members were trained by the CICR. However, there is 
no formalized cooperation and exchange of information among these organizations. 
Furthermore, the Centre at the university has not had time to take up this function during the 
short life of the project. 
Public Outreach 
The CICR had set modest public outreach objectives, such as media coverage, public 
talks, etc. These objectives have been easily attained. In fact, the project could have had more 
public impact than it had, notably through broadcasting and public meetings. However, many 
people in the structure of the project were initially reluctant to stress public outreach past a 
certain point. The CICR principals see conflict resolution training as a serious undertaking that 
must be offered under appropriate conditions. They believe that two-minute sound bites· about 
conflict resolution are not going to make as much difference in Rwanda as proper training for 
hundreds of selected people. Nevertheless, the CICR now realizes that, for a moderate 
commitment of time and money, coverage by the media and public talks can increase the 
demand for CICR training. 
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IMPACT OF THE PROJECT 
Comments from the Trainees 
The trainees of the CICR have been quite satisfied with the courses that they received. 
This has been demonstrated by their answers to the CICR questionnaires, and by the poll and 
interviews conducted during the project's evaluation. 
Many of the trainees expressed some disappointment at not having received a TPN-2 
session after their initial introduction to conflict resolution. Also, many trainees feel that there 
has not been enough follow-up on the course. 'For the CICR this raises the issue of guru:anteeing 
a strong permanent presence in Rwanda for the task of financing advanced courses and recruiting 
for them. The CICR thinks that it will also be important in the future to send the former trainees 
questionnaires devised to measure their retention of knowledge over the long term. Eventually, 
the CICR partner in Rwanda will have to send former trainees some learning material to refresh 
their memory about what they have learned. 
Use of the Training 
Evaluating the impact of such a project is most difficult and leads only to uncertain 
results. In part, this may reflect a weakness of this particular project, as impact baseline 
indicators were not defined at the onset, or were too vague. But this difficulty also reflects the 
inherent complexity of evaluating peacebuilding, an activity that yields indirect and diffuse 
results over the long term. The goal of peace, or at least of diminished levels of violence, is 
affected by numerous factors such as the domestic political situation, the international political 
· environment, economic conditions, social development, demography, educational and cultural 
progress, etc. The impact of foreign aid measures devoted to peacebuilding may be small in 
comparison to the influence of major historical trends. It is also very hard to distinguish among 
the respective impacts of different foreign aid, governmental and civil society initiatives on the 
local situation. · 
As was verified in written and verbal questionnaires, many trainees credibly claimed to 
have used the CICR training in their professional and private lives. However, there is no strong 
evidence that this training has made a considerable difference in Rwanda. There is no incidence 
as of yet of this training having been used to settle a grave conflict in Rwanda. There is no data 
available on the impact of this training in diminishing conflict among co-workers of large 
institutions such as Caisse Sociale. There are no statistics on the use of conflict resolution by 
Gendarmes or by members of R _ seau des femmes. In all fairness, it must be said that significant 
results from conflict resolution will only occur in the long term, after scores of people from all 
walks of life have been trained at increasing levels of competency. 
In the future, the CICR plans to set up stronger baseline indicators of impact by asking 
organizations to provide statistical and anecdotal data on the use of conflict resolution techniques 




Representativeness of Trainees 
Representativeness of all segments of Rwandan society was not an absolute condition for 
this· project. The CICR had other goals in mind, such as ensuring that the trainees were 
influential in society. This meant that some categories, like Tutsis, have been over represented in 
training, since they constitute a large part of the elite strata in Rwanda.9 However, the CICR tried 
to increase its contingents of Hutus, of women, and of people from the countryside during the 
course of the proj ect. 10 
The proportion of Hutus in the training gradually increased, as the training was offered to 
a larger number of institutions. The contingent of women trainees has also steadily increased to 
reach about one half of the total, largely because of the excellent working relationship between 
the CICR and the R _seau des femmes. However, the trainees from the countryside are still under-
represented, compared to the city dwellers. 
In all, the CICR has been training people that mostly represent the city elites, rather than 
members of the traditional and rural communities. In all fairness, this state of affairs depends 
largely on the restricted time schedule of the project, which did not leave much room to look 
beyond the initial set of institutions and reach for other types of organizations. This type of 
extension beyond the urban elites often takes time, and only longer-term funding can guarantee 
it. 
CONCLUSION 
The CICR project in Rwanda has been cited by its clients, its trainees, and by 
knowledgeable observers as a worthwhile contribution to peacebuilding and democratic 
development in the country. It has positively influenced the life and outlook of trainees and has 
resulted in small-scale impacts on Rwandan society. The CICR met most of the objectives it had 
set for this project. 
A first order of lessons learned by the CICR relates to the applicability and diffusion of 
its training in the African context. The CICR has learned in Rwanda that this type of mediation 
approach is understandable and usable by the Rwandans in their daily lives, at work, and in the 
community. Minor adjustments were made to the course and to the written material, but as a 
whole, the CICR package is understandable and potentially useful to Rwandans. 
9 The Tutsis, the main victims of the genocide, share the same language, culture, religion, and places of residence as the 
Hutus. The Tutsis may be differentiated by some physical attributes, and also by their family names. The Tutsi minority 
probably now accounts for 10 to 15 % of the population of Rwanda (there are no reliable statistics on this). However, 
Tutsis tend to be more educated and more urban than Hutus, which means that their proportion among the economic, 
political and administrative elites has always been superior to their actual demographic weight. 
10 It must be mentioned that, in order not to arouse any problems in Rwanda, the CICR has not asked trainees about their 
tribal affiliation and has not set up precise quotas for increasing Hutu representativeness. 
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The CI CR has also confirmed that there is a strong demand for this kind of training, from 
elite as well as mass organizations, from the Gendarmerie to women's organizations to 
university administrators. Some partners are interested in the training ~s a way to acquire modem 
management tools, others see the training as a way to resolve the conflicts that can limit an 
organization's work with its partners, and some see it as a way to create better prospects for the 
relations between Hutus and Tutsis in the country.· 
The project in Rwanda also confirmed to the CICR that basic level training in conflict 
resolution can be offered to large numbers of people, given a committed and dynamic core of 
local trainers. However, the knowledge acquired by the local people must be monitored, 
refreshed, and pursued, in order to maintain a good degree of skins in conflict resolution. This 
requir~s the constant efforts of a solid, self-sustaining and efficient local structure. 
While many people in Rwanda expressed a demand for conflict resolution training, the 
CICR found that many of those were motivated more by the appeal of personal material gain 
than . by objectives of self-improvement or peacebuilding. This is a constant problem in 
development projects, and there are many ways to cope with it. The CICR has decided not to pay 
its trainees, except for a stipend, and the policy has worked. The CICR has learned that 
established institutions in Rwanda can provide potential trainees who understand that the 
training will serve them in their own jobs and activities, and will not require extra compensation. 
The establishment of an efficient permanent local structure has been a source of 
difficulties for the CICR. The CICR at first tried to arrange collaboration with foreign NGOs 
based in the capital city, but this did not work. From this experience, the CICR learned that 
other organizations claiming to be interested in conflict resolution work are not always going to 
cooperate genuinely. Furthermore, although many organizations use the term "conflict 
resolution", it does not follow that they agree on what it entails, because this term has many 
different meanings. 
The CICR signed an agreement for the establishment of a conflict resolution centre at 
the national university located in Butare. There are 'difficulties with this arrangement, as most of 
the potential long-term clients are in Kigali, while the structure is located in Butare. Moreover, 
the university does not give a full support to the CICR-sponsored centre, as it also backs up 
another one financed by the UNDP. 
The CICR has also learned the value of counting on good partners in the country for 
providing the trainees who will make good use of their conflict resolution training. In truth, there 
are many such potential partners in Rwanda, as long as foreign aid programs foot the bill. The 
question is how to choose one's partners. The CICR has learned that reliable partners can be 
found both in civil society and in the state. The CICR has decided not to choose one type of 
partner over another, and has found this open approach has been quite profitable for its own 




While marketing and delivering training programs have their complexities, the CICR has 
also found that fundraising is a difficult endeavour for a small organization. There is much 
competition among development aid projects for the limited resources of a few states and 
international organizations. 
Finally, the CICR has learned about the problems of reporting on and evaluating peacebuilding 
activities. Even. as an organization uses modern management tools such as PPBS-derived 
methods or the well-known Results-Based Management approach, the indicators of 
peacebuilding success are har~ to come by and to verify. The CICR plans to adhere to a strict 
definition of success and rely on precise indicators to assess its activities. However, the CICR 
feels that the effects of aid programs on peace can only be effected and verified after years of 
practice. Time will tell whether the modest CICR efforts will lead to improvements in the 
conflict resolution potential of the Rwandans. 
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List of Interviewees 
In Canada (October-December 1999, June 2000) 
Mr. Vern Redekop, CICR 
Mr. Kendel Rust, CICR 
Mr. Richard Batsinduka, CICR 
In Rwanda (October 1999) 
R seau des femmes : 5 trainees interviewed 
Gendarmerie Nationale : 4 trainees interviewed 
Caisse Sociale : 14 trainees interviewed 
Mr. Ellis Ruhumuriza, Caisse Sociale 
Mr. Protais Musoni, Secretary General, Ministry of Local Government 
Mr. Assane Diop, Chief Economist, UNDPRwanda 
Ms Ang_ le Aubin, Centre d_tude et de coop _ration internationale 
Mr. Silas Siniygaya, CLADHO 
Capt. Anthony Ntalindwa, Gendarmerie Nationale 
Mr. Richard Batsinduka, CICR 
Mr. Fran_ois Munyantwari, ACORD 
Mr. Mark Allen, CIDA, Embassy of Canada 
Mr M_dard Runyange, National University of Rwanda, Butare 
National University of Rwanda, Butare: 14 trainees interviewed 
Mr JeanClaude NiweRukundo, Ministry of Local Government 
Mr Claude Kabutware Rubonesha, PCMCR 
Ms Judith Kanakuze, R seau des femmes 
Ms Suzanne Fafin, UNDP Rwanda 
Mr Michel Dubois, Oxfam Qu _ bec 
Mr Innocent Ruterambuku, Oxfam Qu _ bec 
Mr JeanPaul Kimonyo, Scientific Coordinator, National University of Rwanda, Butare 
Mr JeanBosco Butera, ViceRector, National University of Rwanda, Butare 
Mr David Sezikeye, Save the Children UK 
Save the Children UK : 5 trainees interviewed 
Mr Vincent de Wilde, Danish Centre for Hu,man Rights 
Mr Fergus Karagen, Danish Centre for Human Rights 





GULU CENTRE FOR THE REHABILITATION OF CHILD SOLDIERS 
INTRODUCTION· 




In Northern Uganda, World Vision Uganda's Gulu Centre for the Rehabilitation of 
Child Soldiers is recognized as an important symbol of resistance against the terror of the 
Lords Resistance Army (LRA), a rebel force which has targeted children in its campaign to 
overthrow the Ugandan government. 
In this war, now in its 12th year, over 14,000 children, (usually aged 8 - 14) in Gulu 
and Kitgum districts have been abducted by the LRA. Once captured these young people 
are forced to serve as soldiers and perform acts of extreme violence and depravity. 
Children who escape the LRA show the effects of severe trauma. They require 
careful attention and support to achieve any level of recovery. Equally difficult has been the 
transition back to their families and villages. 
The Gulu Centre has been providing rehabilitation services for former child soldiers 
since 1995. These programs have changed considerably over the past five years. The war, 
funding concerns and, most of all, the needs of the former child soldiers, their families and 
the Northern Ugandan community have required new approaches and adjustments in 
existing programs. This case study chronicles this path in its examination of how 
peacebuilding work must be responsive to the evolving social and political dimensions of a 
conflict. 
BACKGROUND 
The War in Northern Uganda 
Northern Uganda is one of the poorest regions in a country famous for lush green 
beauty, friendly people and a succession of civil wars. As the birthplace of ldi Amin, a 
savage tyrant who ruled Uganda in the 1970s, the North holds a special place in this history. 
Today this past is matched by the North's celebration as the home of Olaro Otunnu, the UN 




As in any war, its history and place inside Ugandan society have shaped the North's 
current situation. Joseph Kony, a charismatic leader who grew up in the Oulu region, leads 
the LRA. Kony and his followers maintain that Museveni neglects the North in favour of 
the South, a claim recognized as holding some truth. Many understand this as a legacy or 
retribution for the years of suffering under Idi Amin's rule. 
In 1986 Museveni's guerrilla army overthrew Milton Obote, Amin's like-minded 
successor. Since that time Museveni has led the government with a power-base comprised 
largely of Southerners. And since the late 1980s, various rebel forces have taken up the 
cause of the North. The first of these was Alice Auma Lakwena (the "messenger") who 
began her movement in 1987 through the recruitment of disaffected soldiers and young 
people attracted to her strong charisma. Though she had some success, her forces were 
. defeated and she fled the country' leaving an opening for a new leader as well as the 
precedent of using children as soldiers for a cause which, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
had some support from the people in Northern Uganda. 
Joseph Kony became Northern Uganda's self-declared "saviour" in 1988. In the 
early 1990s he made some progress. However, by the mid 1990s his fortunes were slipping. 
It was at this point that Kony began. to very actively capture rather than recruit children, 
citing this as part of his military strategy as it gave his cause international attention. 
Kony's abduction of children coincided with· an alliance with the Sudanese 
government. Sudan agreed to provide the LRA with military and logistical support. Since 
1994 Kony's main headquarters are inside Sudan - his army barracks and training station are 
located there. . While not formally acknowledged, this agreement came with a price tag: 
Kony provides child soldiers for Sudan in its fight against the Sudan People's Liberation 
Army (SPLA). So the child soldiers abducted by Kony from his home provinces are used as 
both mercenaries to fulfil his bargain with Sudan and as soldiers in his campaign against the 
Uganda government. 
If this were not enough, Kony's fighting tactics are beyond any normal code of 
combat. Like Alice Lawena, his predecessor, Kony claims that religious forces possess him. 
If so, these are quite evil voices. In their name Kony commands child soldiers to club 
pregnant women to death; cut off the legs of people riding a bicycle or hack off the arms and 
legs of tired child soldiers. Girls captured by the LRA are routinely. passed amongst the 
officers until given to one as a "wife". Children who escape describe their time with the 
rebels as "worse than hell". 
Stories of Abduction & Life with the LRA Rebels 




Ocen Charles, child soldier, 13, Uganda. 
I was abducted in .the morning. I had just finished sweeping the compound for my mother 
and had gone in the house. The rebels came to the door and ordered me to come out. I said, 
"No, I won't." They said they would·shoot me ifl didn't. So I went with them. 
They made me lead the way. After a while, they asked, "Would you like to go back home?" 
I said, "Yes, yes I would." They said, "Okay, then, you can go." 
So I started to walk away, just slowly like that. But then they yelled at me and pointed their 
guns at me. They said, "We've changed our minds, you have to come back." They beat me 
with sticks for not wanting to be a soldier. Then one of them put his gun barrel on my 
stomach. He ordered me to pull the trigger. I was the most scared. But the commander 
shouted, "No, stop, stop, we will keep him, he will be our soldier." 
I remember one time ... 
Dwaka Dennis. 
We walked and walked and walked and walked. I was really scared. 
Because my leg started to swell. I knew if they saw it I would be killed. 
Because that is what they did to children whose legs swelled. 
Because they couldn't march so well. 
We walked for a little time. Then a soldier looked at me and saw my leg. He said to me, 
"You need a rest, you look so tired. Don't you want a rest?" I got even more scared because 
I knew this meant that they were going to kill me, because when they asked you to rest that's 
when they kill you. I said, "No, no, I am happy to walk. I want to go further." So he let me 
go on. 
My soldier husband 
Amony Liliny. 
The man said, "You are going to come to my bed." I refused; I went to sleep where I always 
slept. So he sent someone to get me. I still refused. Then he came with a knife. And he hit 
me four times - it really hurt. So I went to his place. He said, "If you continue to refuse, I 
going to beat you until you die." So I didn't refuse anymore. 
The Establishment of the WV Gulu Centre 
. In 1995 schoolteachers in the Gulu/Kitgum area became openly concerned about the 
returned child soldiers in their classrooms: 
"The children who had been. abducted and then came back to school... returned with a ·very 
different attitude. They might not wish to sit directly to face the teacher, they would prefer 
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to sit by the door or by the window and they would keep getting up to look out the window 
to see if the rebels were coming. 
As many, many were being rescued by the army; the community became very 
paralyzed, not knowing how to help these children. Through our community work we could 
see it was a problem and also the District Authority consulted with us and said, "Can you 
please help."· 
A child psychologist was identified to carry out a survey on the affected children - in the 
army barracks, in the community and with their parents." 
Mark Avola, Gulu CenteCentre coordinator 
The psychologist's findings were devastating. She drew a portrait of children at sea 
in a misery of loss, pain and guilt, unable to find any toeholds of connection between their 
past and the present life in which they so desperately wanted to fit. 
A recommendation was made to create a centre of rehabilitation for child soldiers. 
World Vision Uganda, as the only non-governmental agency working in Northern Uganda at 
the time, was asked to set up this facility. 
DESCRIPTIVE OVERVIEW OF GULU CENTRE'S PROGRAM 
Phase I: Establishment of the Centre 
(1995-1996) 
WV's Gulu Centre opened on March 20, 1995. Its main objective was to provide a 
service to a community that felt both overwhelmed and unable to cope with the problems 
these children were presenting to themselves, their families and their communities. The 
Centre's goals were: 
i. To provide returned children with appropriate medical treatment leading to a steady 
treatment; 
ii. To provide all returned children with recommended therapeutic feeding learning to a 
physical recovery; 
iii. To provide all returned children with an appropriate resettlement package leading to 
improved body hygiene and self esteem; 
iv. To provide all returned children with psycho-social support through individual and 
group counselling techniques leading to a steady return to a normal life style in their 
communities; 
v. To provide children, where possible, with productive vocational skills; 





WV's Centre was established in the middle of Gulu Town. To provide sufficient 
security, a compound surrounded by protective walls and doors was built. This measure 
was later confirmed when the LRA attempted to break down the Centre's back. doors to 
recover "their" soldiers. 
The staff received training in trauma counselling from a child psychologist. All had 
experience in working with bereaved children through WV's program with orphans. A 
tentative plan was established, one which estimated that the Centre would serve 20 children 
at a time. This predication proved to be a drastic under estimation. Within a week of its 
opening the Centre had accepted one hundred former child soldiers. 
Most children arrived in varying states of malnutrition with cuts and bruises all over 
their bodies and legs swollen from long hours of marching. Mark Avola noted that many 
had "terrible wounds that you would not set your eyes to look at a second time." 
The staff found that boys and girls showed different physical and psychological 
repercussions from their time with the rebels. Girls often had acquired STD (sexually 
transmitted diseases) or were pregnant. As they were frequently whipped, many suffered 
from infected scars on their backs and legs; Boys carried wounds from battles with machete 
cuts on their arms, heads and legs. Their different experiences were also reflected in social 
behaviours. While the boys were frequently aggressive and displayed military behaviours 
such as walking in single files, girls were more inward, cowering in fear at the sight of male 
staff. 
So both the number of the children and the complexities of their problems were 
much greater than the Gulu Centre had anticipated. In these early days, the Gulu Centre was 
also juggling a complex of community issues. These included: 1) security concerns; 2) the 
community's lukewarm response to special programs for child soldiers and 3) elements of 
support for the LRA within the Northern Ugandan community. 
The first model for the Gulu Centre involved a high level of community and home 
interaction. The Centre felt that the family, community and child required a gradual process 
of reconciliation where the child could alternate between the Centre and his/her home. 
Unfortunately, the high insecurity meant that this process was not feasible. 
In 1995, Gulu was a town besieged. The LRA were actively abducting large 
numbers of children in the Gulu district. Roads in and out of Gulu town were unsafe. 
Rumours of rebel raids were constantly circulating, creating an atmosphere of fear and 
vulnerability. The government's army was providing little protection for Northern Uganda's 
civilian population. The whole area was in a state of turmoil. Complicating this problem 
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were the community's mixed feelings about a program for the rehabilitation of former child 
soldiers: 
"Some didn't look at it with favour, to see these children being 
assisted. Because they considered them to be very bad children 
who had made all this pain in the community. Some wanted them 
killed as a revenge for what they had done. To see a child who has 
been "in the act" now benefiting was very unwelcomed by many people." 
Mark Avola 
At the same time there were pockets of support for the LRA's activities. These 
people saw the Oulu Centre program as one that was in the hands of the Ugandan 
government: 
"Some even worried that we were an arm of the government 
and would push the children into the army. But as time went 
by they saw that the children were going home and this reduced the 
negative attitude." 
Mark Avola 
These factors meant that the Oulu Centre had a limited impact on overall community 
peacebuilding work. Instead, its major contribution was in direct, humanitarian service to 
former child soldiers. And, in time, the Oulu community began to see that the restitution of 
its children was an important factor in the recovery of the community. 
Perhaps the most important endorsement of the Centre's work were the testimonials 
of former child soldiers as they returned to their home villages: 
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"When I first escaped from the bush, World Vision really helped 
me. I learned that my uncle had died while I was away, this 
devastated me. I thought, what is the point of me escaping if 
my family isn't here - there is nobody here, nobody to look 
after me or to care about me. 
I felt so burdened by sadness and my problems. I didn't know 
how I was going to get back to school, how I was going to have a 
life again. But the people at World Vision encouraged me; they 
encouraged me not to just give up, to believe in myself. They 
told me to keep hoping, to believe that things would get better, 
that I would begin to feel better. They helped me to keep my hope 
alive. They sent me back to school, that meant a lot to me, 
that they believed in me." 
Girl, former child soldier. 
• 
/ \ 
I J \ __ ,/ 
Peacebuilding Component in Phase I 
At this stage, the Gulu Centre's focussed on emergency relief. Since no other NGOs 
were operating in the region, it fell on WV to provide services for all the returnees. WV's 
limited resources had to be stretched to meet the basic needs of hundreds of children. 
While the primary purpose at this stage was humanitarian assistance, much of the 
Gulu Centre's work at that time set the foundation for future peacebuilding efforts in 
Northern Uganda. 
At the community level, WVs establishment of the Gulu Centre was seen as an act of 
direct opposition to the LRA. For the many northern citizens feeling vulnerable to the 
savagery of the rebels' attacks, this support was highly regarded. For parents whose children 
had recently returned it provided much-needed assistance. As noted above, it took some 
time for the community to understand and appreciate this new service. 
Equally important was the fact that World Vision stood up for the former child 
soldiers. Instead of dismissing these children as unredeemable, WV created a centre 
specifically geared to their needs. In doing this WV gave a concrete demonstration of the 
healing or peacebuilding steps required in the reconciliation and restoration of Northern 
Ugandan society. It recognized that a child's trauma of war cannot be ignored or swept 
aside, that it is important to deal with these issues straightforwardly. The fact that the Gulu 
Centre was established in the centre of town underlined this point. 
Phase II: Program Assessment and Expansion 
. (1996 - 1999) 
By mid 1995 the Gulu Centre was confronted by several issues that were hampering. 
its program: 
i. Security within Gulu Town was precarious at best. The army was unable to ensure. 
civilian safety further than five kilometers outside town. Children at the Centre could not be 
allowed to leave the compound. Overcrowding became a problem as more than 300 
nervous, restless children were cramped in quarters intended for much smaller numbers. 
ii. Vocational training was the most realistic option for many youth that had spent years 
with the rebels. However space limitations at Gulu Centre made that impossible. The 
Centre could only provide basic skill training, mostly to keep children from becoming 
bored. 
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iii. The reconciliation and return of children to their families and home villages continued 
to be a difficult and complex business. Some families and communities rejected the 
returnees, either refusing to welcome them home or treating them coldly. Girls suffered 
from shame and humiliation, being teased by other youth and called ~'LRA whores". They 
often suffered from depression and asked to return to the WV Centre. Child soldiers who 
had committed atrocities were characteristically paralyzed by fears of retribution. All 
worried about recapture by the LRA particularly with the limited protection provided by the 
army. 
iv. Cooperation with the Ugandan Army was a time-consuming business, one requiring 
enormous tact, energy and care. 
As security issues reached a crisis level the army recommended that the children be 
moved to a safer place. In August 1996 over 300 children were transported to a former army 
barracks in a rural, isolated area in Keriodongo, one hour south of Oulu Town. The Oulu 
Centre was maintained as a reception for new returnees. 
The Keriodongo site allowed the staff to think of new possibilities and programs. 
And as Northern Uganda's forgotten war finally began to gain international attention, new. 
funding partners also came forward: 
"When we arrived in Keriodongo we thought - wow. We saw 
another opportunity. The place was wide - we restructured 
our design to make a real training. Children liked it. 
That meant that they stayed longer - five, six or sometimes 
even eight months. Some children doubled their training 
doing carpentry, furniture making, and bicycle repair. 
We introduced hair salon. The girls ioved it. We opened up 
land and gave it to the children for gardening. When they were 
returning home we needed lorries because they would be carrying 
sacks of food. That was wonderful because they were bringing 
something to the family. The child wasn't just returning 
home bare-handed." 
Charles, Keriodongo coordinator 
Keriodongo had a friendly, relaxed atmosphere. A cooperative spirit developed as 
youth participated in cooking and the site's general maintenance. The large space offered 
privacy as well as areas for sports and games. Because most youth stayed a minimum of 
three months, more effective counselling was possible. 
The Centre staff developed separate programs for girls and boys. For the girls this 
proved very helpful as they established a strong feeling of solidarity and support. The 




recovery. Just as important was their participation in the Keriodongo community and 
receiving praise and recognition for their work. 
If the Keriodongo site provided new programming opportumt1es, there were 
drawbacks. Its remote location meant that families had limited access to their children. 
Many parents were very frustrated by this and it made the reconciliation process more 
forced and formal. The location also removed the Centre from the community's view and 
thus reduced its effectiveness as a community peacebuilding initiative. 
If the location posed a difficulty, these problems were exacerbated by a new 
government policy whereby villages were encouraged (some would say forced) to move to 
protected camps or villages. 
These protected hamlets caused a huge disruption in the fabric of Northern Uganda's 
village life. People complained of feeling perched in camps, which provided limited 
s~itation facilities and few ways for residents to have a productive, active life. Many 
mistrusted the Ugandan Army's claims of better security. For returning children, this 
changed location was often unsettling. Without the solace of familiar physical surroundings 
and home life, many found it difficult to adjust, particularly as their parents were dealing 
with their own feelings of dislocation. 
During this time the LRA made a bold military strike by capturing 40 girls at a 
boarding school. The tremendous anguish caused by this event removed most vestiges of 
support for the LRA. It also led to the formation of the "Concerned Parents Association", a 
group of parents of the abducted children who advocated for their release and gained 
international attention and support for their cause. This group worked closely with WV's 
Oulu Centre, partly because one of its staff members was a member of the association. 
A second challenge for the WV Centre emerged during this time. OUSCO (Oulu 
Save the Children Organization) was founded and set up a t rehabilitation centre for former 
child soldiers in Oulu Town. On the one hand this provided a welcome respite for WV's 
overly taxed centre, the common reason given for the establishment of OUSCO. It also 
demonstrated a major change in community thinking as local citizens, including the sheriff, 
sat on OUSCO's board. However, for WV, it was an adjustment and initially a competitive 
atmosphere developed between the two agencies as each claimed primacy of place in 
meeting the needs of the returnees. 
OUSCO insisted on its greater authenticity as a local initiative as opposed to WV 
with its international connections. In response, WV pointed to the credibility gained from 
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many years of community work. GUSCO countered by pointing out that it was now based 
in the community where WV was apart, in Keriodongo. 
While these issues were more about territory, the bigger and more divisive debate 
has focussed on methodological issues. Where the WV facility is founded on Christian 
principles, GUSCO's programs are based on traditional healing practices. Each has 
criticized the limitations of the other's views. 
This methodology question will probably never be completely resolved. Both 
centres understand that their approach is the more appropriate one·. And both approaches 
hold legitimacy and value, depending on a child's background. I:or a child from a church 
going family, a recovery program based on Christian principles is no doubt very effective. 
However, it holds much less merit for a young person with little or no connection to these 
beliefs. 
Equally, traditional healing methods can provide a former child soldier with a 
community-level absolution that he/she desperately needs. But the use of culturally based 
approaches must.be tempered by the degree to which traditional views have meaning for a 
child who may or may not have not grown up with these beliefs. Ideas of 'tradition' and 
'culture' are very fluid in the late 20th century world and require careful defining in order to 
have meaning for youth that have been exposed to a variety of outside influences. For some 
. children traditional culture is to be feared, not revered, particularly as Kony has contorted 
these practices to suit his role as a medium of the spiritual world. 
These issues are complex and difficult to address. However, it is a great credit to 
both agencies that they have learned to respect each other and allow their differences. 
GUSCO and the WV Centre have become cordial community colleagues. The WV Centre 
has cautiously begun to participate in some traditional healing ceremonies. There is talk of 
joint programming, particularly around issues where there is common agreement on purpose 
and methods. There is considerable room for dialogue as both centres begin from the 
position of their total c~mmitment to the children. 
Peacebuilding Component in Phase II 
. Between 1995 - 1999 the Gulu Centre attended to the needs of over 5,000 returned 
child soldiers. The Centre's community based peacebuilding function was less direct. 
Peacebuilding work has many dimensions and involvement with children, particularly child 
soldiers, requires new views on how a community forgives and forgets violent acts. The 
existence of the Centre gave these children a second chance, an opportunity to begin to 
recover from the war and become productive citizens of their society in the future. Instead 
of hiding and feeling ashamed of their activities, the Gulu Centre proclaimed that the 




traditional definition of peacebuilding work, it is a much-needed service, especially in a war 
such as Northern Uganda where children's participation is a central fact of the conflict. 
Phase Ill: Stronger Emphasis on Community-based Peacebuilding Work 
(1999 - present) 
In the latter part of 1999 the WV Centre returned to its original intention of 
community involvement in programming and peacebuilding work: 
" In order for peace to be sustainable the community has to be involved ... A child can't help 
but question how, with all the protection that is around me - my parents, my relatives, the 
police, the army, the whole judicial system - how is it that I can be pulled from all these 
means of protection and taken into captivity in Sudan ..... It is important for the community 
to understand how everyone is involved in the failure to protect that child ... " 
Mark Avola 
The Keriodongo site closed in December 1999. During that year the LRA spent 
considerable time in Sudan. Fewer children were being abducted and even less were able to 
escape or be rescued by the Ugandan Army. As the immediate crisis receded, "donor 
fatigue" set in. It became both impractical and expensive to maintain the large Keriodongo 
site. WV returned to its centre in Gulu Town. 
This move prompted WV to reassess its programs, a process resulting in a decision 
to base the vocational training program in the children's home villages. Local artisans were 
engaged to provide training on an apprenticeship basis. The Gulu Centre was maintained as 
a transition post for receiving new returnees. 
The Gulu Centre also developed an extensive community caregiver program to assist 
in the transition of youth into their villages. By 2000 they had 600 volunteer community 
caregivers, 420 of these based in Gulu District. 
The villages responded positively to this new approach, one which maintained that 
the primary responsibility for the protection and support of the children lay with the 
community: 
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"Gradually the community said, "we want to volunteer." 
We weren't making World Vision people; we were making people 
people. Instead of going through us, we had them contact the 
local authority. They would send in their application to be trained. 
It had to be the community to identify people that would be 
acceptable to them. Many people were given training in trauma 
counselling so they could go back to their community to be like 
a lamb amongst the people." 
Mark Avola 
This program has been a success. But it is risky work and involves a major 
transition for· WV staff to being community facilitators instead of deliverers of direct 
service. Increases in LRA rebel activity can quickly undermine months' of carefully 
established work and people's commitments to the restoration of village life. Northern 
Ugandans speak of the rebels as "very slippery", that they slide in and out of the 
countryside, seemingly at will. Caregivers and artisans fear for their iives. 
However, there is a strong "determination to do this work" as Northern Ugandans 
recognize that they must reclaim their villages and address the many threads of history, 
culture and past injustices which have created the complex matrix ofthis long-standing war. 
Equally, WV recognizes that a return to the community is the only way to have real 
possibilities for change. 
Peacebuilding Component in Phase III 
World Vision 's peacebuilding work continues to strengthen to the point that it is 
beginning to take its direction directly from the community: 
"What is very important about the caregivers in the community is .that they now identify the 
needs in the community and we program from them .... We now depend on the experience of 
the caregivers to tell us what we should do, how we can help." 
Mark Avola 
In the future the Gulu Centre·also plans to involve returned children in community 
work, saying, "they understand the problem much better." This.approach takes the problem 
full circle, making youth as actors for change in situations that have so drastically affected 
their lives. 
New program needs are also emerging. By now, many returned children have been 
settled in their communities for two years or more. But they still speak of a deep 
loneliness, of feelings of displacement. Program follow-up or peer groups may need to be 
developed to support these young people. WV is also being asked to do family counselling 
to support parents crumbling under the stress of years of war, family instability and 
frighteningly insecure children. In both these cases Gulu Centre will probably need 
additional staff training and orientation for these new roles. 
Of course, all program plans are at the mercy of the war. Recently Northern Uganda 





. more easily. When visiting the Gulu area you can feel the eagerness of the citizenry to 
return to normal life, to put the many years of conflict behind them. 
In response to this, WV has become an active advocate for peace on the international 
stage. This is not an entirely new role - in the past WV has often provided speakers on the 
experience of war for international conferences. However, its recent participation in 
conferences has included discussions on peacebuilding initiatives. 
In September 2000 Canada's International Conference on War Affected Children had 
a major focus on the situation in Northern Uganda. These talks were informed by the 
interventions of Mark Avola, Gulu Centre coordinator and two youth delegates who had 
been abducted by the LRA. As many people noted, the fragile progress made during these 
sessions was in large measure due to the contributions of these three delegates. 
As the WV Centre evolves, its understanding of its role as a peacebuilder continues 
to change. The balance between service delivery/humanitarian assistance and proactive 
community peacebuilding work will inevitably continue to fluctuate. · At this point, the 
emphasis is on community peacebuilding initiatives. 
LESSONS LEARNED 
The Gulu Centre case study offers a host of "lessons learned" for people working on 
peacebuilding issues, particularly those involving children. Many have already been 
addressed in this case study but the following points are important to highlight: 
i. Peacebuilding programs involving children, particularly former child soldiers, have a 
complex of issues to address. Any agency working with former child soldiers must find 
ways to accommodate the direct service requirements of these young people while leading 
the community to have a more compassionate understanding of their needs. Central to this 
is the agency's educating of the community to broaden its definition of the· role of these 
young people and the level of responsibility they have for their activities. 
ii. Children are an important reference point in any community-based peacebuilding work. 
Concern for children can be a rallying point for peacebuilding work and can help break 
down long-standing competitive grudges in the community. 
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111. Peacebuilding initiatives and rehabilitation programs for childreri must address the 
different needs of girls and boys: This is an area that is often ·acknowledged but little work 
has been done to address this programming need. At the Gulu Centre, progress has been 
made on this issue but much more is required both there and in all programs dealing with 
the needs of war affected children. 
Gender based. work to support child soldiers must be sensitive to many different 
factors: 1) the cultural/social background that defines gender roles and the position of girls 
and boys in the community; 2) the different war experiences of girls and boys; 3) the 
psychological impact of these different experiences, particularly on self-identity, self-worth, 
self confidence and trust of others and 4) the community to which girls and boys will be 
returned and their changed status as a result of the war. 
iv. Children experience w~r trauma differently than adults, partly because their experiences· 
are often different and also because of their age. In creating programs for young people it is 
important to begin from their understanding and definition of needs. Not all children 
require direct counselling but all former child soldiers do need to be given a renewed sense 
of worth and· acceptance. This work cannot be all be done by a rehabilitation centre, it 
requires the involvement of the community. 
11 As the children grow, the problem grows and changes. 
As they open their minds and look around these children can 
see a ruined future. A bitterness can develop in them ... 
So the intervention must be long-term and as involving as 
possible so that everyone becomes a participant in the issue. 11 
Mark Avola 
v. A peacebuilding agency's credibility is much stronger if it has been present during all 
facets of a conflict. Many people refer to the fact that WV was operating in Northern 
Uganda during the early days of the conflict when other agencies thought it was too 
dangerous. WV's evident loyalty and long-term commitment has been an important factor in 
gaining trust and support. 
vi. Peacebuilding is about working with rather than resisting change. In conflict situations, 
new situations and circumstances are emerging all the time. World Vision has had to 
respond to events with flexibility and openness. The central ingredient in WV's success has 
been its constant focus on the children. All of its changes or program adjustments have been 
seen through this prism. 
vii. Donors should provide long-term funding for peacebuilding efforts. This has been 
·stated repeatedly by all evaluations of peacebuilding programs. Without that constant base 
of support, agencies cannot respond adequately to the needs of their community. Neither 
should donors expect agencies in conflict areas to predict future activities with absolute 
accuracy. For instance, a potential donor asked WV to estimate how many children it 
38 
-.. 
would be receiving each month: an impossible question whose response is beyond WV's 
control to answer. 
viii. Donors should be more than just money-givers. In whatever way possible, donor 
agencies should provide political support for the agency's work and the cause for which it is 
fighting. World Vision Uganda cited WV Canada's work with them as an example of the 
value of this type of partnership. 
ix. In peacebuilding work, it is not always possible or even useful to be neutral, to see both 
sides of the question. 
The fact that WV is understood to be strongly opposed to the LRA and its activities 
has made a big different to the children it supports. They need an advocate, someone who 
clearly says that what was done to them was wrong. 
x. . No one agency can do everything. It is important to understand the most effective 
role that you can play while at the same time recognizing how this fits into the overall 
context of the conflict situation. This is particularly true in working with children, as an 
agency must ensure that its way of meeting children's needs is consistent with the 
community's movement towards peace. 
CONCLUSION 
WV's Gulu Centre for the Rehabilitation of Child Soldiers demonstrates what can be 
accomplished through the efforts of determined and dedicated staff. In a few short years 
Gulu has grown from being a fairly ad-hoc reception and treatment centre to a community-
based service playing an active peacebuilding role in the Northern Ugandan community. Of 
course, this has not been an easy path, particularly as staff have been operating with limited 
resources inside a totally unpredictable environment. There is always room for 
improvement in any facility. But the Centre's commitment to former child soldiers has had 
an enormous impact on the individual lives of the many girls and boys it has served. In 
doing this, the Gulu Centre has put into practice the fundamental principles of 
peace building: 
39 
"I didn't know what I was going to do, I felt so lost. . 
But they believed in me, they helped me and made me understand 
that I was a good person and that I could have a future. 
I thank them." 
Boy former child soldier, Gulu 
"---r' 
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Global Alf airs Research Partners 
CONTEXT AND BACKGROUND11 
The war in Bosnia began in April 1992 and lasted until the Dayton Peace Accords 
were signed in December 1995. Like all wars it was bloody and vicious, but it was also 
singular in that it shattered any high-minded illusions about a post-Cold War New World 
order. The governments of the world mostly stood by as in the heart of civilized Europe 
neighbour slaughtered neighbour and a new phrase, "ethnic cleansing", was invented. 
Not so humanitarian organizations. CARE, for instance, began operating in the 
Balkans as early as 1993, with a project for the trucking and delivery of food, medicine, and 
other humanitarian supplies. The same year, CARE also opened a small project to provide 
shelter for displaced elderly and children at two·residential centres on the Dalmatian co.ast 
of Croatia. 
The height of the war in 1994 saw the lalinch of CARE=s first major project B for 
the supply of emergency water purification pumps to war-damaged neighbourhoods of 
Sarajevo. Soon after, CARE began what would become its largest project in terms of scope 
and funding B the REACH project, which provided life-sustaining relief in the form of 
material and other support (health care, psycho-social support) to vulnerable individuals 
suffering extreme deprivation because of the war. These included above all the elderly, btit 
also displaced families, orphaned children, the war-wounded, and the handicapped. 
By 1995, REACH was serving 30,000 beneficiarie~ at any one time, operating in 
more than 30 communities, and employing more than 400 Bosnian staff. It attracted praise 
and financial support from major international don?rs, including CIDA, UNHCR, OFDA, 
11 Much of this background is drawn verbatim from Barbara Shenstone=s overview of CARE=s work. See 
Barbara Shenstone, Overview. CARE=s Peacebuilding Programme in Bosnia-Herzegovina 1995-1998 (unpublished 
paper). 
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ECHO, DFID, and from individuals and institutions in Austria, Germany, Norway, the UK, 
the USA, and Canada. 
All these projects shared one overriding humanitarian goal: to save lives and reduce 
suffering. The REACH project, in particular, addressed the problems of one group "the 
elderly" that was in great need and being missed by mainstream relie(efforts. The project 
took CARE into some of the worst living situations imaginable for a civilian population in 
the midst of war, and its wide scope "in all three ethnic communities, over a large area of 
Bosnia" depended on the skills, knowledge, and commitment of a large number of Bosnian 
staff, both professional (doctors, nurses, psychologists, social workers) and semi-
professional (home-care givers, drivers, logisticians). 
By the end of the war, then, CARE had developed an extensive operational · 
infrastructure (with 10 sub-offices), and had acquired considerable local knowledge in the 
form of contacts with local authorities, information about local institutions and their 
capacities and needs, as well as a wide understanding of the social and physical needs of the 
nation's most vulnerable populations. CARE was also committed to an even-handed style 
of operation that could function in the territories of all national groups and was known to all 
the parties in conflict. 
With the war's end in 1995, CARE undertook an assessment12 of its program to date 
in Bosnia and recognized that peace, and more precisely, the peace process implied by the 
Dayton Agreement, required new types of thinking and programming. 
[I]t was not simply a question of switching gears from emergency relief 
programming to development programming, or imagining a continuum from 
one to the other. CARE recognized it was grappling with an entirely new 
beast, a country where peace remained extremely fragile, where there existed 
powerful forces that could undermine it in the short and long term, and where 
any activity, no matter how apparently benign, could do as much harm as 
good. 
·CARE determined that an overarching goal of all its programming should be to work 
with and for the positive forces for peace, and to avoid and mitigate the forces for further 
conflict and war. With this in mind it moved to develop a program for peacebuilding based 
on a very broad definition of the concept. 
This definition recognizes that in peacebuilding there is a need for both state 
building (elections, legal reform, fiscal management, military reform etc) and attending to 
12 Corey Levine, Democracy Jn Bosnia & Herzegovina. Strategic Assessment for CARE International 
in Croatia/ Bosnia & Herzegovina (April 1997). 
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the human dimensions of war. The latt.er emphasizes the social and economic dimensions 
of peace, which includes attending to people=s needs, feeling, and aspirations. According 
to CARE, peace is built from the bottom up, the top down, and from the middle, both up and 
down. The task of peacebuilding, then, comprises a variety of disparate activities, including 
micro-enterprise development, targeted humanitarian aid, reconstruction of infrastructure, 
and citizen's empowerment. It also includes many actors -- international, state, and sub-
state -- working over a medium to long time frame. CARE concludes about peacebuilding: 
There are no quick fixes, especially for changing attitudes and healing 
psychological wounds, and positive results can be swept away suddenly if 
hostilities re-intensify to polarize and isolate those in conflict. The roles of 
peace building imply flexibility, sensitive analysis of local contexts, and a 
willingness to work with local individuals and groups. They emphasize the 
fundamental building block of peace B the creation of a vibrant civil 
society.13 
CARE identified a number of key areas where it felt highly qualified to· contribute to 
peace building 
• Infrastructure reconstruction (focusing on community assets, capacity building, and 
citizen's empowerment) 
• micro-credit to promote small businesses; 
• nurturing civil society 
• · working in schools to promote tolerance, understanding, and peaceful problem-
solving; 
• advocating national policies for the protection of vulnerable groups. 
Notable about these activities was that they included, even after the war, attention to 
humanitarian aid for the vulnerable, and would continue to do so until such time as 
economic growth and recovery would allow society to provide for these things, or make 
them less necessary. The REACH program would continue until responsibility for it could 
be handed over to local officials and CARE would work to ensure that social welfare 
became a priority. 
13 Barbara Shenstone, Overview. 
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The CARE peacebuilding program in Bosnia, then, is rightfully called multi-faceted. 
Aside from the civil society-strengthening project, it includes: 
• The PAX Project, which uses educational drama and theatre to address war-related 
trauma among children and youth and to promote peaceful problem solving and 
conflict resolution. 
• Project WELCOME, a project to help deal with war refugees and displaced 
persons returning to thefr homes or re-settling in other communities. The project, 
which includes information centres in different ethnic communities, helps to deal 
with the social stress of returnees. The centres provide legal advice to individuals 
and groups and information on local social health and educational services. It also 
engages in trauma healing and problem solving/conflict resolution 
• The NGO Foundation was established as an independent organization to support 
the development of local NGOs in Bosnia. The Trust Fund runs independently of 
international assistance, providing technical and financial support to local NGOs as 
international funding runs out. While the NGO foundation has been able to attract 
support for specific projects (e.g. CIDA's Peacebuilding Unit recently funded CARE 
to implement a capacity building project to strengthen the Foundation), to date no 
donor has been willing to fund the endowment because such funding is not expensed 
but sits in the endowment indefinitely. Thus, while the fund was intended to act as a 
sustaina]?le source of funding for NGOs, its own sustainability is questionable. 
• Social Policy Reform and Local Capacity Building was an outgrowth of CARE=s 
concerns that humanitarian aid for the most vulnerable in Bosnia must accompany 
initial peacebuilding efforts. In 1996 it began to lobby governments and 
international agencies concerning the need for national social policies to protect the 
most vulnerable in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In 1997 CARE spearheaded the drive for a 
national conference on social welfare and the protection of vulnerable groups, out of 
which was established a National Social Policy Task Force (NSPTF). This Task 
Force, for which CARE provided the secretariat, is co-chaired by the two entity 
ministers responsible for social welfare. It is working to build a social welfare 
system in Bosnia. 
CARE's approach to its program was purposefully eclectic, experimenting with an 
assortment of activities, knowing that some in the long run may turn out not to have been 
worth the effort involved. This experimental nature has, in large part, been dictated by the 
fac~ that peace building in Bosnia, and in general, is itself in its infancy, with little empirical 
knowledge about what works under what circumstances and what doesn't. While CARE 
admits that its peacebuilding program in Bosnia is somewhat experimental in nature, its 
various projects are underpinned by certain shared values, including commitments to: 
• vulnerable groups (youth, elderly, disabled); 
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• groups engaged.in community life and public good; 
• widening the space for social and political activity at the grassroots level; and 
• · tolerance and flexibility in project design. 
In these terms, the promotion of civil society is at the very least an implicit, if not an 
explicit, aspect of nearly every CARE project in BiH. They also help to explain why 
attention to civil society in BiH became an important and explicit focus of CARE's efforts 
there. Ian Smillie, a respected Canadian development consultant, who did an evaluation of 
CARE's project, noted that the lack of a vibrant civil society in Yugoslavia before the war 
may have played a role in allowing things to go as far as they did: 
Blame for the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the ensuing war has been laid 
at many doors .... What made the contributing factors more menacing, 
hpwever, was the lack of institutional and public resistance to trends which 
in other countries would have been halted before they reached anything like 
dangerous proportions. The absence of a free press, weak or non-existent 
concepts of political democracy, and a stunted civil society made Yugoslavia 
and its component parts highly vulnerable to political opportunists and 
predators. 14 
If civil society was virtually non-existent before the war in Yugoslavia, the situation 
after the war was even direr. As CARE noted in its project proposal to CIDA: 
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li1 addition to the individual human toll and physical· destruction, nearly all 
the social structures that constituted patterns of civic life were either gutted, 
disrupted or transformed by the war. These range from the smallest family 
unit, through local. community institutions, labour and commercial groups, 
professional and academic associations up to the largest national political and 
social structures. A clear consequence of the war has been the disintegration 
and weakening of community bonds, and the creation of mutual distrust, 
paranoia and hostility, in a once predominantly multi-ethnic society .15 
14 Ian Smillie, PROJECT PHOENIX Strengthening Civil Society in Bosnia: A Case Study 
15 CARE Canada, Project Proposal. Strengthening Civil Society in Bosnia-Herzegovina. December 1998, 
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For CARE, the restoration of civil society in BiH is key to the building of 
democracy and peace. They cite the work of Harvard's Robert Putnam who argues that 
neighbourhood associations, choral societies, and sports clubs are not just a by-product of 
social and economic prosperity, they are essential underpinnings of it. CARE concluded 
that in BiH supporting non..:governmental groups and voluntary associations, would 
significantly contribute to the deepening and strengthening of the peace process, 
underpinning its formal arrangements with a variety of institutions and associations that can 
form the basis of future social and democratic development. 
CARE's Civil Society Strengthening Projects 
CARE defines civil society as the many organizations, institutions, activities and 
forms of association that give expression to the diverse interests, convictions, and objectives 
of a committed citizenry. Examples of civil society organizations include church groups, 
women's groups, unions, sports and leisure associations, NGOs, co-operatives, business 
clubs, self-help groups, youth/children's clubs, academic networks, professional 
associations, chambers of commerce, and charities. 
CARE emphasizes that civil society is a process rather than a goal, that is to say that 
the actual functioning of the organizations, the activities they conduct within and amongst 
themselves to achieve an end, is more important than the end itself. It is the learning and 
gaining of experience that really matters. 16 The civil society process includes creative and 
useful confrontation and debate and encourages participation from all elements of society. 
CARE's program for civil society development is multi-faceted . The first phase of 
the program, entitled Building Peace in Northwest Bosnia-Herzegovina, began in 1996 with 
funding from the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) 17• Focusing on 
Northwest Bosnia, Western Republika Srpska and Eastern Slavonia in Croatia, this program 
had four objectives: 
• To repair two major public facilities in the health and education sectors, one in each 
region; 
16 Andrew Hamilton, Program Review and Assessment of CARE Canada Civil Society Development 
Program Bosnia-Herzegovina [for the Multilateral, Regional and Renaissance Programs Central and Eastern 
European Branch of the Canadian International Development Agency]. (October 1998), p. 30. 
17 For a good overview of this project see: Andrew Hamilton, Ibid 
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• to carry out four small-scale reconstruction projects, two in each region (small scale 
community infrastructure rehabilitation; 
• to strengthen at least four local groups in civil society through technical and/or 
financial support: and 
• to facilitate coordination among the Canadian contingent from SFOR, CARE 
Canada, and Queen's University in support of cooperative reconstruction efforts in 
Bihac. 
The emphasis on small to medium sized infrastructure repair and reconstruction in 
the project is a reflection of CARE's finding that these types of activities are an effective 
entry for civic organizations: 
For in fixing up a building or room, 1ocal groups can test their own mettle, 
can become known in their communities, and in engaging with local 
authorities for permits, municipal services, etc. can develop skills in 
advocacy and self-empowerment18 • 
CARE's effort to strengthen civil society was added to with funding from Norway 
(NORAD) for Project Phoenix. This project was originally designed to facilitate the 
growth of Croatian and Bosnian civil society by providing technical and material support to 
a minimum of 16 grassroots organizations in the regions of Eastern Slavonia (Croatia), 
Western Republika Srpska, and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The program 
continues with NORAD funding as well as a new grant from CIDA (Strengthening Civil 
Society in Bosnia & Herzegovina) as well as funding from the independent Mott 
Foundation. 
The emphasis in CARE's civil society programming is on youth, the elderly, and 
women. Its uniqueness among programs of international donors dealing with NGOs in BiH 
is that it insisted on working with associations that were already "organically rooted" in 
their communities, and as such would be self-managed, low budget, and driven by a 
volunteer ethic. This approach evolved from CARE's determination during its assessment 
that most international donors were using local NGOs primarily for service delivery, with 
little long-term thought about their sustainability or survival. 
To date, CARE has worked with a host of civil .society organizations in Bosnia, 
providing them with technical and material support, small grants for equipment, and 
training. Those groups include: 
18 Shenstone, Overview, p. 7. 
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The Association of War Invalids and Paraplegics of Una Sana (Bihac) 
Preporod (Revival) Youth Group (Bosanski Petrovac) 
The Association of Pensioners (Cazin) 
Flamingo Youth Centre (Bosanska Krupa) 
The Association of Paraplegics Cazin 
Women from Una (Zena sa Une) Women=s Association (Bihac) 
Youth Communication Centre (Banja Luka) 
Golden Fall Voluntary Youth Association (Prijedor, Doboj, Bijeljina, Banja Luka) 
Vidra's Women's Association (Banja Luka) 
Nada Women's Association tPrijedor) 
Elderly Club 15-100 (Banja Luka) 
DIS Alternative Youth Theatre 
Banja Luka Summer Festival 
Prijedor Youth Computer Club 
AIESEC (International Association of Economic Students (Banja Luka and Pale) 
Herceg Novi Conference on Social 'Policy and Welfare (Pale and Banja Luka 
representation) 
Student's Union - University ofBanja Luka 
Scouts Organization (Banja Luka) 
CARE's role in these projects is as catalyst and collaborator. It seeks no more than 
to strengthen the capacities of the local groups and encourages their active participation. 
The groups analyze their own needs, set goals, plan, implement, and monitor their work. 
Activities supported have included community action, improved membership and decision-
making, enhanced sustainability (through income generation) networking and collaborative 
action among ethnic groups, improved equipment and facilities, and strengthened advocacy. 
LESSONS LEARNED 
Lesson 1: It is a distinct advantage when engaging in peace building after war, to have had 
prior experience in the country and to have developed a reputation for even-handedness in 
dealing with different groups. A well established organization also usually has a well-
established infrastructure and contacts in the country that it can use to carry peacebuilding 
to all communities. 
Perhaps one of the most significant advantages for CARE in shifting from 
humariitarian aid to peacebuilding in BiH was its long experience in the country. Working 
since 1993, CARE had a much admired track record in Bosnia. As Ian Smillie noted, 
CARE had worked with the three ethnic communities, had supported local self-help efforts, 
and had thought through some of the larger implications of what it proposed in Project 
Phoenix. 
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Through its prior work, CARE had established a reputation for even-handed 
operations and an operational presence in all territories of the conflict. CARE, then,. was 
well positioned to work with all sides, and to explore opportunities for inter-ethnic dialogue 
and reconciliation. Similarly, its knowledge of many different communities meant it was 
well placed to identify and work with local groups and partners in furthering the 
development of civil society. CARE=s commitment to the vulnerable, furthermore, 
naturally led it to remain involved with issues of social welfare and protection. 
Lesson 2: Be open and flexible about the approach you take to peacebuilding and in dealing 
with partners and recipients. Be prepared to change direction or· modify the program to 
respond to corrected perceptions of needs. Of course, such flexibility will often depend not 
only on .the organizations themselves, but also on those who are funding the project. In· 
CARE's case, both donors (NORAD and particularly CIDA) were flexible and CARE itself 
had the advantage of a dynamic/experimental management structure. 
CARE had some three-years experience working in Bosnia prior to establishing its 
civil society strengthening program. Not surprisingly, it approached that program with 
some well-formed notions about what was required and how that should be achieved. 
CARE soon learned that most of these notions would have to be scrapped. As Ian Smillie 
noted in his evaluation of Project Phoenix: 
CARE soon discovered that a lot of its original ideas were not going to work. 
The idea of finding up-and-coming organizations that needed "intensive" 
management or financial training was not. realistic. Several international 
NGOs had already established "capacity-building" projects, and most local 
organizations had attended one or even several of these. They complained 
that their real needs- mostly financial and political - were being ignored and 
[sic] favour of lengthy sessions on how to prepare "mission statements", 
project proposals and reports. Some had already learned these basic tricks of 
the trade and did not need this sort of "capacity building". 
One of the hallmarks of the CARE project, then, has been its flexibility and the 
organization=s willingness to change direction.' As one of the interviewees noted, the 
difference between CARE and others is that you can talk to them about what you want to 
implement, while others dictate programs and what will be funded, sometimes asking for 
0 things that are not needed. 19 While CARE approached the civil society project in BiH with 
some ready-made notions about what needed to be done and how to do it, it was fi:exible 





enough to change· direction based on an assessment of the situation on the ground and 
information provide by its partners. · This leads to a third lesson. 
Lesson 3: It's important to check project assumptions by conducting research to identify 
specific needs and appropriate methodologies. This research should begin with potential 
partners and individuals who have local knowledge of the area and in the field where the 
project will be operating. 
John Crownover, CARE's civil society program director, notes for instance that it is 
important to make sure programming is connected to the needs of the community. 
Organizations need to do research, then, to determine precisely what those needs are. 
Donors, in turn, must be open to adjusting their programs to those needs rather than 
proceeding with a program that fits predetermined criteria. The latter rather than the 
former is, lamentably, too often the case. Indeed, CARE's program appears to be the 
exception to the rule, as Hata Masinovic indicated in her remarks above. Bojan Stanevi/ of 
Radio Balkan, part of the Youth Communication Centre in Banja Luka, parsed the need to 
do research into three elements. He stated that international organizations coming to work 
in BiH need identify what is needed, who is doing what, and how their work contributes to 
peacebuilding. 
In conclusion, then, the elements of any particular project, even if they have been 
carefully shaped in project development, should always be checked against the reality on 
the ground once the project gets underway. Even CARE, an organization with longstanding 
experience throughout BiH, found it necessary to modify its civil society strengthening 
program based on what it found on the ground. To its credit, CARE was willing and 
flexible enough to do so. 
Lesson 4: Working from the beginning in partnership with a good cadre of long-term local 
staff is very important. No one knows the situation in the field better than the local 
individuals and organizations that have lived and worked there, many their entire lives. 
They will also be there to carry on peacebuilding long after the donors have left. It is 
critical to the success and sustainability of the project that they be equal, willing, and 
enthusiastic partners. 
Open and equal partnerships are critical to the success of CARE's work in Bosnia. 
Roger Chamberlain, the project manager for PAX, goes so far as to state that it is 
problematic whether you can have peacebuilding without a strong, firm relationship with 
local organizations. His thinking is that you should take what already exists and build on it. 
Long term peacebuilding in Chamberlain's mind requires real collaboration. For 
one thing, outsiders coming into a country are in a sensitive position because they need local 
knowledge. To build a partnership in which local knowledge will be shared means taking 
your time and getting to know your partner. Establishing communication, building trust, 




So is humility on the part of the donor partner. Sejo Duli/, Chamberlain's local 
counterpart in the PAX project, noted that their collaboration was successful because 
Chamberlain did not come in as an expert. His attitude was more like "I have knowledge, 
you have knowledge, lets exchange that knowledge and do a job." This contrasts with the 
attitude of many international donors who introduce themselves as experts. While they are 
usually welcomed into a war-tom situation where the needs are great, it is often the case that 
after a few days they are found to have misrepresented themselves. They are often 
beginners with little expertis~ in the job they are supposed to do. This leads, Duli/ notes, to 
a double disappointment: non-experts spending money on the wrong things. 
Lesson 5: As far as possible include as partners and local professional staff, people from all 
sides of the conflict. This can be very difficult, especially in cases when donor funding is 
biased against one side, which has often happened in Bosnia. Vigorous donor advocacy in 
terms of working with all sides is sometimes required In a multi-ethnic and partitioned 
society . such as BiH this may require working in different geographical regions of the 
country where these groups are· represented. 
Deeply embedded animosities between ethnic groups are sure to remain after civil 
wars, especially ones in which atrocities take place. This must be an implicit consideration 
in any peacebuilding project from the beginning, with the added proviso that in some areas 
it will be impossible to quickly eradicate or, in some instances, even begin to address such 
animosities till some time has passed. Nevertheless, peacebuilding cannot take root unless 
and until such animosities are removed or channeled into non-violent expression. 
By working in different regions in BiH and hiring professional staff from different 
ethnic groups; CARE ensured that its civil society strengthening project had an implicitly 
built in mechanism for· addressing animosities. For instance, CARE brought its staff 
together from the various regions for training purposes, a process which in itself helped 
them to overcome their prejudices.20 
CARE also sought to ensure that each of the civil society organizations it supported 
was open to any ethnic group, and this was true of every organization we visited during 
research to prepare this case study. Bringing the groups together opened their eyes to the 
fact that members of other ethnic groups shared their individual suffering. CARE found 
that this approach was particularly effective with youth in BiH that were natural "risk-
takers" and rebelled against the nationalism coming from mainstream channels. . 




Lesson 6: Peacebuilders need to balance the open-ended, long-term needs of peacebuilding 
against the fact that funding is almost invariably available only for a relatively short period. 
It is important, then, to get things started as soon as a possible, especially networking, so 
that the initiatives can then take on a life of their own. 
There will always be tension between the long-term requirements of peacebuilding 
and the fact that funding is usually time-limited. As a result, projects will often have to be 
abandoned or shut down before they have run their full course. CARE's WELCOME 
project is an example. Its office in Doboj has run out of funding and will have to shut down 
long before the job is complete. As one of the staff noted, offices like their own are still 
very necessary yet at this critical point are having to shut down. This is absolutely the 
wrong time to shut down, they said, just as more people are returning. But ECHO, the 
donor, is closing up shop, which means CARE will have to look for another donor.21 The 
tension between long-term needs and short-term funding has effects that go beyond 
peacebuilding. For the local staff, for instance, the end of a project also means the end of a 
job. 
As far as possible, then, peacebuilders need to ensure that their projects are self-
sustainable beyond the funding time-frame. There are several ways to approach this. Roger 
Chamberlain of CARE's PAX project notes that it is important to take what already exists 
and help the organization build on it. Indeed, CARE at the outset noted that most 
international donors tended to create civil society organizations in Bosnia as service 
organizations for their own work. Once the donor cut off funding the organizations ceased 
to ~xist. CARE, instead, sought to work with organizations that already existed, providing 
them with small amounts of funding for equipment or to help them renovate office quarters, 
but not for salaries. This they found to be very important in order to encourage voluntarism 
a commodity in the BiH environment that has often been in short supply. The onus, then, 
was put on the organization to become self-sustaining. A good illustration of this principle 
in action has been the evolution of Kastel-fest, a cultural and arts festival in Banja Luka. 
While CARE provided initial funding for the annual Kastel-fest, its organizers, the Youth 
Theatre, can now proudly claim that 60% of the budget for the festival is now raised 
locally.22 
CARE also focuses its support for these organizations in a way that helps to make 
them sustainable. It emphasizes: 
21 Interview with Vlado Pijunovic, Information Officer, WELCOME Information Centres. 
22 Interview with members of Youth Theatre DIS/Kastel-fest in Banja Luka. 
53 
• · capacity building and material support; 
• networking arid linkages; 
• seminars, education, strategic planning; 
• small-scale reconstruction and rehabilitation; and 
• support of small income-generating projects. 
CARE also helped to establish the NGO Foundation in BiH, which is intended to 
provide a more stable local source of funding for the third sector in Bosnia. This has been 
difficult, however, and.the Foundation continues to struggle to meet this overall mandate. 
Lesson 7: Focus and plan strategically. It is important not only to think in terms of the 
project or program's sustainability itself, but beyond the project to how it contributes within 
a broadly conceived intellectually grounded peacebuilding framework. 
During our interview, the outgoing Country Director of CARE's program in BiH, 
Howard Bell was in a highly reflective mood about CARE's work. While he was, for the 
most part, satisfied with the work CARE had done, he worried that the program was based 
on a "leap of faith". The project was well implemented and operationally sound, he argued, 
but lacked an overriding philosophy about how it will contribute to the developmental well-
being. of society in the long term. He stated that there is a need to join the dots and be more 
explicit about how we are addressing. peace building writ large. 23 Of course, his criticism js 
true about almost any peacebuilding project, all of which to a certain extent are based on 
leaps of faith. Nor was the Country Director's viewpoint shared by CARE Canada as an 
organization. In fact, the other CARE staff interviewed strongly opposed this view~ 
Nevertheless, this issue, again, goes to the question of sustainability of the effort. It 
is partly addressed, as John Crownover noted, by ensuring that there are resources in the 
local community to carry on after the donor organization leaves. 
·Lesson 8: Peacebuilding sometimes involves taking carefully calculated risks and 
experimentation. While planning and strategic focus are important, in some instances, and 
organization may need to take a risk in order to kick-start a process. 
Some of CARE's most important accomplishments in BiH involved taking a risk. 
For example, its concern that social policy issues were being forgotten in the rush to 





reconstruct Bosnia, led CARE in 1997 to push for a cross-entity conference on social policy 
issues. It was the first conference of its kind to cross ethnic boundaries and did so at 
considerable risk. Kendra Gregson, who was principally responsible for organizing the 
conference, noted that one security incident would have set the whole process back 
enormously. Nevertheless, the payoff was huge. The conference resulted in the 
establishment of a Social Policy Task Force in Bosnia chaired by assistant ministers from 
both entities. Social issues, which Gregson argues, are as important to peacebuilding as 
infrastructure reconstruction, are now entrenched in the Bosnian peacebuilding process.24 
CONCLUSION 
In many ways, CARE Canada's civil society strengthening project in BiH could 
serve as the poster child for this kind of peacebuilding. It became clear during the field 
work to prepare this case study that CARE is doing not only good and meaningful work in 
BiH, but is doing it the right way. Its long experience in the country and familiarity with the 
right and· wrong way of doing things, ensured that CARE had already absorbed many 
lessons prior to implementing its civil society project. It took those lessons to heart. As a 
result CARE has furthered its reputation in the country and among the recipients of its 
peacebuilding largesse. 
It is a well deserved reputation. An independent study rated CARE number 2 among 
20 organizations working in Bosnia. The ranking was a result not only of the amount of 
money contributed to peace building but in terms of how they helped in generaV5 The most 
important lesson learned from this case study, then, is that CARE has not only learned many 
lessons, but applied them as well. 
24Interview with Kendra Gregson, Social Policy T~sk Force, Bosnia. 
25 Interview with Hat a Masinovic, Women From UNA, Bihac. 
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CONCLUSION TO THE REPORT 
It could fairly be said that our knowledge of peacebuilding is still in its infancy. 
While the concept certainly has intuitive appeal, we know very little about how 
peacebuilding works, under what circumstance it works, or even whether it works at all. 
Nor is it certain that we will be able to draw definitive conclusions about the effectiveness 
of peace building anytime soon. We know that peacemaking has· worked if a peace 
settlement, peace agreement, or cease-fire is arrived at as the end result of a diplomatic 
process. We know that peacekeeping has worked if the operation successfully keeps the 
peace until other more enduring processes are set in motion (and the operation can take its 
leave). 
But when (or how) do we know if peacebuilding has worked? Unlike peacemaking 
and peacekeeping -- the other two members of the peace troika -- peacebuilding does not 
have a definitive end-state. It is difficult, if not impossible, to pinpoint how long we need to 
peacebuild, in any given situation, to ensure that conflict will not be renewed. How long 
does peacebuilding need to be applied before we can safely say that it has done its work? If 
another conflict arises, even 10 to 20 years after the first, should we conclude that 
peacebuilding has failed? More specifically for this particular study, can we determine, in 
peacebuilding terms, when, whether, or why a particular project or program has succeeded 
and how can we account for the result? 
These are not easy questions to answer, primarily because building peace is almost 
always a multi-faceted undertaking. Depending on the circumstances, it . may include 
activities and efforts at a variety of levels (regional, country, state, municipal, community, 
or neighborhood). A failure at one of these levels may doom the whole enterprise. It will 
also, in all likelihood, skew the peacebuilding results of a particular project. 
A given peacebuilding project, for instance, may be internally consistent, that is it 
may meet the objectives it was designed to meet with the resources and within the 
timeframe allotted by the donors. Yet its impact on peacebuilding may be negligible, or at 
the very least limited, due to factors beyond the control of the project participants. How, 
then, should the project be viewed? Should it be seen as a success or failure? How should 
we interpret the lessons drawn from it? 
This discussion begs the more fundamental question: are we learning lessons about 
peacebuilding or simply lessons. about implementing projects in a peacebuilding 
environment? The distinction is subtle but important. If we are doing the former, the 
lessons we learn will enable us to develop projects or programs that better contribute to the 
building of peace in conflict prone societies. If we are doing the latter, the lessons we learn 
will enable us to implement better projects or programs with results that are internally 
consistent with the objectives of the project, but that may be very limited in their impact on 
peacebuilding writ large. 
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Both approaches are valuable, but the distinction between the two points to the need 
for greater precision when we talk about lessons-learned in peacebuilding. To what end are 
we learning these lessons and in anticipation of what result? The answer to that question 
should determine the approach 'we take to lessons learned. The CPCC is one among many 
organizations and individuals around the world that are engaged, in one form or another, in 
learning the lessons of peacebuilding. But as was stated about the concept itself, most if not 
all of these learning exercises are in their infancy. The CPCC's own lessons-learned process 
has been underway for just two years. From the outset, it concerned itself with a set of 
realistic and realizable objectives: 
To encourage organizations to think about their work in terms of peacebuilding; 
• to extract some tentative lessons from the experience of a few organizations engaged 
in work in the field; 
• to share those lessons with a wider community inside and outside government; 
• to engage With other organizations .that are conducting their own lessons learned 
processes; and 
• 
• to refine and revise our methodological approach to learning lessons as we go . 
. These objectives have largely been met over the lifetime of the project. The 
organizations that submitted their projects for study all agree that their participation in the 
process has been positive and useful in helping them think about the peacebuilding aspects 
of their work. The lessons from the first phase of the project were shared with the NGO and 
government communities through CPCC meetings, workshops and the annual Government-
NGO Peacebuilding Consultations. The CPCC has developed close relationships with 
others conducting lessons-learned processes including the International Development 
Research Centre (IDRC), the Collaborative for Development Action, and the European 
Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation. It has shared its work with members 
of the Canada-Japan Joint Peacebuilding Learning Project. The methodology, which began 
as a typology of peacebuilding activities, first evolved into a lessons-learned framework 
(including a questionnaire), and then into a methodology for conducting research in the 
field. It will continue to be revisited and revised as a tool for NGOs that want to conduct 
their own lessons- learned activity. 
But what about the lessons we are learning? From the outset, the CPCC has had 
modest aims in conducting a lessons-learned process, aims that were matched by modest 
resources. What would a typology of peacebuilding look like? Can we develop a 
framework for learning lessons? Could we achieve worthwhile results by applying the 






this was the question of-whether what we were doing was useful to the NGO peacebuilding 
community. 
The first phase of the project, then, was experimental. While the lessons it elicited 
were tentative, it was clear from the reaction of the NGO and government communities that 
the process itself was worthwhile and yielded significant results. Given that reaction, and 
with the encouragement of IDRC, the CPCC decided to take its work a step further by 
venturing into field research. The thinking was that field research accompanied. by a more 
rigorous and sophisticated methodology would result in the extraction of more empirically 
grounded lessons. 
The results of the second phase validated this thinking. The CPCC learned valuable 
lessons both about implementing peacebuilding projects and about the process of learning 
lessons. It learned, for instance: 
• that the time and resources provided by donors for peacebuilding projects rarely 
match the project's long-term requirements, with the result that projects often come 
to a close before their peacebuilding impact has been fully realized. In Guatemala, 
for instance, some interviewees complained that the Fund ended, just as 
organizations were beginning to find there feet. For local people this might generate 
a sense of abandonment or a.lack of seriousness on the part of the implementer. 
• that youth, who are often more flexible than adults as well as being open to new 
ideas, and in favour of change, can be an important focus of peacebuilding, 
providing it with energy and sustainability. In the case of CARE Canada's work in 
Bosnia, the youths we interviewed all seemed to be extremely self-motivated and 
willing to question or challenge official dogma. 
• that the process of building peace can sometimes be more important than achieving 
the stated goal of the project; the process brings people together and opens 
communication among them, giving them the sense of doing something that is 
meaningful, even if only in a small way. Again in the case of CARE some of the 
older people involved in elderly associations were clear-eyed about the limited 
contribution they could make to peace overall, but grateful to have places to gather 
with their friends and keep occupied. Similarly, the local people from different 
ethnic groups hired to help CARE implement its civil society strengthening program 
found that by interacting with others from different ethnic groups helped to break 
·down preconceptions and prejudices; 
• that it is critical to involve local actors in every aspect of the peacebuilding process 
from project design to implementation; local people provide insight and knowledge 
that the outsider does not have; men, women, children, the elderly, different ethnic 
groups, etc., each of whom may have experienced the war differently and who will 
have unique perspectives to bring to peacebuilding, should be among those 
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represented locally; also if staff and their skills can be retained over the long-haul 
they bring important institutional memory to the project; 
• that flexibility in the field and on the part of the donors is a key ingredient in 
successful peacebuilding, allowing NGOs to adjust their projects and programs to 
particular needs and changing circumstances in the field; the. peacebuilding 
environment is a shifting dynamic one~ and in the cases under review here, those 
organizations that were flexible and adaptable to that environment were more likely 
to implement successful projects or programs; 
• that an organization with an exemplary history, solid reputation, and deep 
experience in a country will be well s~rved by those characteristics when it turns to 
the task of building peace. The experience of the CICR in Rwanda, while valuable, 
shows the difficulties that newcomers face in a situation with which they are not 
entirely familiar; and 
• that in peacebuilding it is not always possible (or smart) to be neutral. In Uganda, 
for instance, it was important that World Vision be seen as opposed to the Lord's 
Resistance Army, which is mainly responsible for victimizing children in that war. 
·World Vision's opposition gave the children confidence. 
These are important lessons, to be sure, but they are far from generalizable, having 
been drawn from only five cases. Indeed, our experience with the Reflecting on Peace 
Practices Project, which included the examination of niore than twenty cases, shows that· 
even with a broader group of cases it is difficult to be confident that the lessons learned are 
generalizable. Moreover the lessons we learned differ little from what has been learned by 
organizations that have been implementing development projects or delivering humanitarian 
aid. While on the one hand this is good, on the other hand we have to ask if learning the 
same lessons over and over means that organizations to some degree fail to internalize them. 
Ultimately, then, we need to ask what these lessons mean. 
This recalls the question voiced earlier: To what end are we learning lessons? Are 
they intended to help NGOs design and implement projects that contribute to 
peacebuilding? If so, we are probably claiming too much in this report. Peace is at the best 
tenuous in Bosnia, Guatemala, Rwanda, and Uganda. Nor is their any hard evidence that 
these projects are contributing to the building of peace in any of those countries. It is, quite 
simply, too early to tell. What we can claim is that these lessons may be useful to 
organizations hoping to implement similar projects or programs in a peacebuilding 
environment. The problem here has not been with the projects themselves, but with the 
disconnect between the methodology and what we hoped to learn by using it. 
Of course, this was not entirely unexpected. The CPCC's lessons-learned project 
has always been as concerned with advancing the methodology as it has been with gathering 
lessons. In fact the project was designed so that the two would exist in a kind of feedback 
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relationship: The methodology would help us learn lessons and the limitations of what we 
learned would point to the limitations of the methodology. The latter could then be 
improved in the interest of learning more sophisticated lessons; 
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What, then, is the value-added of this phase of the project? First, the NGO 
community in Canada can take the lessons and test them against their own experience, 
validating some and perhaps invalidating others. Second, in some cases, such as the need 
to match time and resources with peacebuilding requirements, NGOs can use the 
information gathered to deal with donors. Third, NGOs will be better informed about how 
others implement peace building projects, and may be encouraged to ·share experiences. 
Fourth, the inethodology can be adapted for use by NGOS to extract lessons-learned from 
their own experience. Fifth, judging from the knowledge we gained of what is being done 
elsewhere on lessons-learned, we can be confident that we are on the right track and asking 
the right questions. 
But perhaps more than anything, what this phase of the project has shown is that we 
have to cast our net much wider if we hope .to learn how projects can best contribute to 
peacebuilding. The approach used in this study is good as far as it goes, and certainly case 
studies will always be an important component of any lessons-learned methodology. 
Indeed, they have helped us uncover important lessons about implementing projects in a 
peacebuilding environment. But we have also learned that we need to be more precise 
when we think and talk about lessons-learned in peacebuilding. If we truly want to learn 
how to better contribute to peacebuilding through these projects we will have to look at the 
bigger picture and how projects like the ones under review in this report fit into it. 
In its work on peace and conflict impact assessment, the IDRC has argued that 
analysis should take place at three levels: Country, program, arid project.26 The same is true 
if we hope to engage in a comprehensive and meaningful approach to peace building lessons 
learned. We will have to take account of the work that is being done at all levels in all 
spheres and how it relates to other work being done across and within levels. This is 
certainly a daunting task, but now is the time to strategize about how to accomplish it and 
begin to take the next steps in doing so. 
Those steps might include commissioning a study of several lessons-learned projects 
to critically analyze what is being learned across a wide body of work and what tools are 
being developed; exploring the possibility of joint evaluation processes with northern and 
southern NGOs, similar to the Canada-Japan Peacebuilding Lessons Learned Project; and 
producing case studies of projects of a similar nature and level in order to increase 
comparability. These are only a few ideas, but they could be the beginning of a broader 
approach to learning lessons about peacebuilding. That is the approach that this report seem 
to be turning us toward. 
26 Necla Tschirgi, Peacebuilding Evaluation. A Paper Prepared for the Canada-Japan Planning Workshop on 






AN OVERVIEW OF OTHER LESSONS-LEARNED ACTIVITIES 
The work so far of the CPCC on lessons learned in peacebuilding is but a modest 
contribution to the work being conducted in this and related areas by a number of 
organizations and individuals around the world. Much of that work has been going on for 
years and is worth keeping abreast of in order to reflect on the work we are doing and to put 
it into perspective. The following is an annotated list of organizations that are engaged in 
some kind of lessons learned process in peace building or a related field. It is not intended to 
be comprehensive, but merely to provide a sense of some of the work that is going on in the 
world. Our purpose here is merely to identify some of the many organizations engaged in 
some sort of lessons-learned activity, with a brief description (in some instances, every 
brief) of what they are doing. A more detailed analysis of their programs and findings will 
have to await a later phase of the project. 
Humanitarianism and War Project (H&W) 
The Watson Institute, Brown University 
Providence, Rhode Island 
Larry Minear 
The H&W project is now in its third phase having been in operation for some ten 
years. The project consists of a program of policy research that focuses on the practical 
problems of (and solutions to) providing aid during violent conflict.· 
From 1990-96, the project participants conducted case studies in a variety of war 
zones around the world, including Europe, Asia, Africa, Central America and the Caribbean. 
In each of these studies they looked at the interplay of humanitarian activities with political 
and military institutions, focusing on operational issues · and formulating practical 
recommendations. The result has been the publication of a plethora of case studies, 
handbooks, training materials, books, articles and op-Des, mostly intended for. the 
practitioner but also of interest to policy analysts, academics, government officials, and the 
general public. The third phase of the project began in 1997 and has a strong focus on 
institutional learning by humanitarian organizations. 
Reflecting on Peace Practice Project (RPP) 
The Collaborative for Development Action (CDA) 
Cambridge, Massachusetts 
Mary Anderson, Laura Olsen 
The Reflecting on Peace Practice Project (RPP) is being run jointly by the CDA and 
the Life and Peace Institute of Stockholm. The RPP is using a case studies approach to 
gather the experiences of different agencies involved in conflict focused programs. By 
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comparing and analyzing their different experiences, the RPP hopes to identify what works 
and what doesn't under different circumstances~ The aim of the project is to improve the 
practices of agencies engaged in this type of work and thereby ensure increasingly positive 
outcomes. 
A total of 28 cases have been produced in varying countries including Sri Lanka, 
Croatia, Burundi, Israel/Palestine, South Africa, Cyprus, the Philippines, the Balkans and in 
Latin America. These cases have been presented at workshops in Cambridge and Upscale 
held in October 2000. 
War-Torn Societies Project (WSP) 
Geneva 
Mathhias Stieffel 
This project began in 1994 as a joint initiative of the United Nations Research 
Institute. for Social Development and the Program for Strategic and International Studies, 
Geneva. Its objective is to assist the international community and national actors to better 
respond to the challenges of countries rebuilding as they emerge from war. The project 
used what it termed participatory action research (PAR) in four country studies (Eritrea, 
Mozambique, Guatemala and Somalia) to gain a better understanding of the complex 
challenges involve~ in rebuilding war-tom societies and to create experimental spaces for 
interaction between different actors concerned with post-war rebuilding. 
The pilot phase of the project concluded in December 1998. With its successful 
completion, the donors to the project decided that much value was to be gained by 
continuing and expanding the project to include other countries and contexts. On January 1, 
1999, the· WSP Transition Program (WSP-TP) began in order to establish a WSP successor 
body. In institutional terms, WSP-TP is established as a joint initiative of the United 
Nations Development Program (UNDP), United Nations Department of Political Affairs 
(DPA), and The Program for Strategic and International Security Studies (PSIS) of the 
Geneva Graduate Institute of International Studies. 
Lessons Learned From Peace Support Operations 
The Canadian Council for International Peace and Security (CCIPS) 
Ottawa 
Douglas Fraser 
The mandate of the CCIPS is to develop and advance innovative Canadian policies 
on issues of international peace and security. It is currently conducting major research 
projects in a number of areas including one on lessons learned from peace support 
operations. 
This study is based on the assumption that the experience of Canadian peacekeepers 
has, heretofore, been treated as anecdotal at best and has had little impact on current policies 




... \ ____ / 
The Joan B. Roe Institute for International Peace Studies 
University of Note Dame 
I \ 
'-----~) 
The Roe Institute' s education and research programs are organized around four 
themes, one of which is the role of international norms and institutions in peacemaking. In 
this research area, faculty and students search for way to make intergovernmental 
organizations and other institutions more effective and· representative and to increase 
compliance with fundamental norms of peace and human rights. 
Analysis of deep-rooted Conflict 
The Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution 
George Mason University 
The Institute offers Ph.D. and Masters degrees in Conflict Analysis and Resolution. 
Major research interests include the analysis of deep-rooted conflict and their resolution; the 
. exploration of conditions attracting parties to the negotiation table; the role of third parties 
in dispute resolution; and the testing of a variety of conflict intervention methods in 
community, national and international settings. 
The Humanitarian Policy Group 
The Overseas Development Institute 
London, UK 
The Overseas Development Institute bills itself as Britain's leading independent 
think-tank on international development and humanitarian issues. Its mission is to inspire 
and inform policy and practice that lead to the reduction of poverty, the alleviation of 
suffering and the achievement of sustainable livelihoods in developing countries. It 
provides high-quality applied research, practical policy advice, and policy-focussed 
dissemination and debate. Its work centres on five research and policy programs, including 
the Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG). 
The objective of the HPG is to improve policy and practice of organizations and 
donors in response to conflict, instability' disasters and associated humanitarian needs. Its 
focus in the '90s shifted from natural disasters to man-made complex political emergencies~ 
Its goal is to develop clear and consistent policy recommendations across a number of 
different but related areas, which are widely disseminated. Its researchers are currently 
working on issues of aid politics, policy and principles, accountability, evaluation, and 
natural disasters. HPG has played a leading role in the recent surge of interest in issues of 
learning and accountability in humanitarian assistance. ODI has also been working on 
surveying the field and proposing tools for conflict impact assessment. 
The Overseas Development Council (ODC) 
Washington, D.C. 
Nicole Ball 
The ODC focuses on the interrelationship between globalization and development, 
and improved multilateral responses to these linked challenges. The future of multilateral 
development assistance, with a sub-category on conflict resolution and peacebuilding, is one 
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of its programs. The goals of this program are to shape the evolving development 
cooperation agenda through analyses of key development problems and to contribute ideas 
and influence decision making on the redesign and future financing of multilateral 
development efforts .. 
Nicole Ball is the research fellow at the ODC responsible for conflict resolution and 
peacebuilding. She has produced a number of publications related to lessons learned in 
peacebuilding, including Complex Crisis and Complex Peace: Humanitarian Coordination 
in Angola (1998,with Kathleen Campbell), a report on lessons learned fron UNOCHA's 
involvement in Angola between 1993-1996; Making Peace Work: The Role of the 
International Development Community {1996); and Conference Report on Making Peace 
Work: Lessons for the International Development Community (l 996). In addition to the 
. work of Ms. Ball, the ODC hosted in 1999 a conference on improving the effectiveness of 
humanitarian and transition programs. 
Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment 
The International Development Research Centre (IDRC), 
Ottawa 
Necla Tschirgi, Michael Koros 
The Peacebuilding and Reconstruction Program Initiative at IDRC is responsible for 
creating and developing the Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment tool, a method for 
gauging the effect that intended development projects might have on the tendency toward 
peace or conflict in a particular area. 
Initial work on the PCIA was conducted by Ken Bush who produced a working 
paper for IDRC in March 1998 entitled A Measure of Peace: Peace and Conflict Impact 
Assessment (PCIA) of Development Projects in Conflict Zones. The paper served as a 
working document for a two workshops held in June 1998. 
This year the PBR-PI is launching Phase I of the PCIA project. In this phase they 
will start building contacts in the South to expand the evolving body of knowledge and 
expertise on PCIA and . as to test the viability of building the multi-agency partnership 
required for a more extensive project on PCIA. 
The United States Institute of Peace (USIP) 
Washington, D.C. 
Among the research and other activities carried out by the USIP is a special initiative 
on Bosnia in the Balkans, which is largely devoted to discovering ways of facilitating the 
Dayton Peace Accords. One of the products of this initiative was a special report on NGOs 
and Peacebuilding in Bosnia's Ethnically Divided Cities (1998). · 
This report included a section on lessons from NGO implementers' and donors' 
experiences in Bosnia. Some of those lessons included: Use participatory programming in 
post-conflict relief work; strengthen the community, not the leaders of the conflict; work 
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through partnerships within a community; help the whole community to improve 
conditions; direct humanitarian resources through private sector channels where possible to 
reintegrate resources; reduce commercialization and symbols of the international 
community at the local level; create a guiding donors' strategy and a practical set of 
coordination principles to accomplish it; and strengthen the public sector -- particularly at 
the canton level -- to establish partnerships with the emerging civil society. 
Post-war Reconstruction and Development Unit (PRDU) 
University of York 
UK 
The PRDU specializes in research, consultation, and training of professionals in the 
planning and management of reconstruction after war; humanitarian intervention during 
crises; and post-war recovery. 
Centre for Peace Research and Strategic Studies 
Catholic University of Leuven 
Belgium 
The Centre focuses on violent conflicts, field diplomacy, democratisation and 
conflict prevention, European security, security and conflict prevention in Africa, conflict 
impact assessment, missed opportunities, and peace architecture. 
International Peace Research Institute, (PRIO) 
Oslo, Norway 
PRIO was founded in 1959 and was one of the first peace research institutes in the 
world. Its foundation was instrumental in promulgating peace research throughout the 
world.. It currently runs four research programs: Conditions of War and Peace; Ethics, 
Norms and Identities; Foreign and Security Policies; and Conflict Resolution and 
Peacebuilding. Under the latter program it runs a number of projects that have a lessons 
learned aspect, including the Balkan Dialogue. Most notable is its project called The 
Peacekeeper. Norway's contribution to peacekeeping in the Middle East: Lessons learned 
from UNTSO. 
International Crisis Group 
Brussels, Belgium 
ICG is a private multinational organization committed to strengthening the capacity 
of the international community to anticipate, understand and act to prevent and contain 
conflict. ICG's approach is grounded in field research in which teams of political analysts 
based on the ground in countries at risk gather information from a wide range of sources, 
assess local conditions and produce regular analytical reports containing practical 
recommendations targeted at key international decision-makers. 
The organization is currently active in nine crisis-affected countries world-wide: 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, Macedonia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Algeria, 
Burundi, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Indonesia. In Kosovo a team of 
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three analysts is reporting on the peace process and efforts to defuse tensions, establish the 
rule of law and create a functioning system of self-government. In August the ICG issued 
its latest report on Kosovo which comprised a fresh evaluation of the international · 
Community's performance in that country since the end of the conflict in June 1999. 
German Development Institute 
Berlin 
Stephan Klingebiel 
The Institute has produced a study on the impact of development cooperation in 
conflict situations. The purpose of the study is to explore the role that German development 
·cooperation has played in conflicts and crises in the past, looking at both aspects that have 
defused conflict and those that have exacerbated it. 
Initiative on Conflict Resolution and Ethnicity (INCORE) 
Londonderry 
INCORE was established in 1993 as a joint effort of the University of Ulster and 
United Nations University. It purpose is to address the management and resolution of 
conflicts over territory and identity. It engages in research, training and other activities that 
inform and influence national and international organizations working in the field of 
conflict. 
INCORE has established a Policy and Evaluation Unit to ensure that what is learned 
from research and practice in conflict is incorporated into policy and programs. It studies 
both successes and problems in the design and development of research that is intended to 
have a policy impact. Its goal is to make best practices more widely known. It is also 
involved in evaluating the impact of interventions in conflict in order to contribute to the 
development of practical initiatives in the broad field of conflict resolution and 
transformation. It is currently involved in the CDA's RPP project Breaking the Cycle of 
·Violence. 
Breaking the Cycle of Violence, which is still in the development stage, is an action-
research project to analyze lessons learned and generate and test new ideas for dealing with 
situations of conflict. It will bring together peacebuilding practitioners with researchers to 
share and analyze ongoing experiences and come up with new ideas and approaches. 
Forum on Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER) 
London, UK 
FEWER is a multi-sectoral and multi-disciplinary network of NGOS, academics, 
UN agencies and governments involved in conflict research, campaigning, and policy 
development. It spans Asia, Africa, North and South America, and Eurasia. 
Research by FEWER members' aims to support the overall network objective of 
providing early warning and informing peacebuilding activities. Members are involved in 




Beginning in 1998, FEWER has been producing the annual Conflict and Peace 
Analysis/Response Manual, a framework for understanding trends in areas of potential and 
actu'.al conflict, as well as identifying approaches for conflict prevention, reduction and 
peace building. 
Conciliation Resources (CR) 
London, UK 
CR was founded more than five years ago to serve as an international resource for 
local or national organization,s pursuing peace or conflict prevention initiatives. The 
principal objective is to support sustained practical activities of those working at the 
community and national levels to prevent or transform violent conflict into opportunities for 
social, political, and economic development based on more just relationships. 
CR has collected the lessons it has learned from its more than five year's experience, 
a period of time in which it said the learning has never stopped. These lessons have been 
published in CR's 2000 Annual Report. 
Centre for Conflict Resolution 
Rondebosch, South Africa 
The Centre runs a number of projects and programs in a variety of areas from 
mediation and training services, to school programs, to prison projects. It also runs a case 
studies program which focuses on succes~ful peacemaking at the grassroots level in Africa. 
The goal of the program is to build capacity in conflict resolution and case study 
methodology. 
Conflict Prevention and Post-Conflict Reconstruction Network (CPR) 
(Working group of bilateral and multilateral donors) 
CPR focuses on information sharing, coordination and best practices in 
peacebuilding, managing complex emergencies, early warning indicators and measurements 
for project evaluation. It has produced a compendium of Operational Frameworks for 
Peacebuilding and Donor Coordination. 
The McGregor School 
University of Antioch 
Antioch, Ohio 
The school hosts . the Action Evaluation Project, which since 1993 has engaged 
. dozens of scholars and practitioners worldwide in systematically defining, promoting and 
assessing success in conflict resolution and development projects. 
Conflict and Development Network (CODEP) 
University of Manchester 
UK 
The Contribution ofNGOs to Peace Building in Complex Emergencies is a research 
project that examines the impact of NGO work on violent conflict, how NGOs contribute to 
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peacebuilding and how their work can be strengthened and supported. Case studies are 
being conducted on projects in Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, and Liberia. 
European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation 
Utrecht, The Netherlands 
A network . of 70-80 European organizations interested in peace building, The 
European Platform encourages the formation of national coalitions, conducts surveys on 
conflicts and their backgrounds, conducts media activities and education and collects case 
studies of "People Building Peace." The European Platform has also established a working 
group to help NGOs enhance their programming in war-tom and war-prone societies. 
EU Conflict Prevention Network (CPN) 
Ebenhausen, Germany (and Brussels) 
CPN is a network of European institutions and individuals which the EC and 
European Parliament draw on for policy papers and other inputs. It has commissioned 
International Alert and Saferworld to write a· paper surveying the field and recommending 
how the EC might operationalize PCIA at the planning and evaluation stages. In October 
1999, it published a manual on its conflict impact assessment tool, which is intended to 
assist practitioners to identify significant problem areas that have the potential to lead to 
violent conflict in a given country. 
Report on Evaluations of German Development Cooperation in Six Countries 
The Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development 
Germany 
This report, published in August 1999, was commissioned to study the impact of 
German development cooperation iri conflicts and crises. The countries examined included 
El Salvador, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mali, Rwanda and Sri Lanka. Experts in teams of two, 
resulting in six evaluations that looked at the positive and negative effect of the German 
development program on conflict in the chosen countries examined each country. The aim 
was to identify factors in development cooperation that contribute to conflict prevention or 
resolution. 
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
The ministry has conducted a lessons learned exercise of Norwegian experience in 
peace-making and peacebuilding in six countries: Mali, Sudan, Mozambique, Rwanda, 
Burundi, and Guatemala. It will soon be releasing the results of its two-tiered evaluation of 
its peacebuilding program and its broader development cooperation from a peace and 
conflict impact standpoint. 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development-Development Assistance 
Committee (OECD-DAC) 
Paris, France 
The DAC Working Group on Monitoring and Evaluation is currently looking at 
options for evaluating the effectiveness of humanitarian assistance. 
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CANADIAN PEACEBUILDING COORDINATING COMMITTEE 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
1. Descriptive 
1.1. What type of activity is/was your organization engaged in? Where? 
1.2. What is the history of the conflict in which it took place? What is the cultural, societal 
context? 
1.3. Is peacebuilding taking place before, during, or after the conflict? 
1.4. What were the goals of the undertaking and what did you want to achieve? Was 
peace building expressively mentioned as a goal of the activity? 
1.5. In the event that peacebuilding was not an explicit objective, why do you consider this 
project a part of peace building? 
2. Process 
2.1. How did the idea for your intervention originate? 
2.2. How did you fund the project? What were the main problems in this area? 
2.3. How were responsibilities defined and attributed for the conduct of your project? 
2.4. What were the main challenges in personnel issues? Did you have to hire people, to re-
train people, or to re-direct people for this project? 
2.5. How did you decide on your partners in the project and on your type and place of 
deployment? 
2.6. Did you perform activities that were well known to you, or did you have to innovate? 
2.7. Did this activity have any consequences on the overall structure, culture and procedures 




3.1. Who were the actors involved in the peacebuilding activity and what were their roles? 
3.2. How did the different actors involved contribute to the success or failure of the 
peacebuilding effort? 
3 .3. Did your effort mesh with other peace building efforts in the area, if at all? 
4. Evaluative 
4.1. Did your project have results in lessening violence or the threat of violence? Did it lead 
to a more peaceful situation, or at least to prospects for it? 
4.2. How much control did you have over the outcome? 
4.3. What other factors beyond your control had an impact on the outcome of the 
peacebuilding effort? 
4.4. What unintentional or unanticipated outcomes resulted from yoi.Ir actions, if any? 
4.5. What was the impact on specific vulnerable· groups, such as women and children? Can 
it be disaggregated from the general targeted population? 
5. Prescriptive 
5.1. What else would you do differently next time and why? 
5.2. What have you learned about peacebuilding that could be applied to other efforts, your 
own included? 
5.3. What role, if any, did the Canadian government's peacebuilding initiatives (fund and 
mechanism) play in your project and how could that role be improved? 
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ASPECTS OF THE LEARNING PROCESS 
A- The first order of business in the lessons-learned process is similar to the familiar 
steps of program evaluation. 
+ What were the objectives and goals of the project? 
+ Did the project meet these goals? 
+ If not, why did the project not fulfill its objectives? 
+ What roles did organizational factors, partners, milieu conditions, lay m the 
attainment or non-attainment of some of the objectives? 
B- The second aspect of learning. involves understanding how the program fits in with 
other programs existing in the field. 
+ What other programs, locally or externally sponsored, aim to achieve results similar 
to those of the program in question? 
+ Did the organizations responsible for these programs coordinate their actions? 
How? If not, why not? 
+ What have you learned about coordination? 
C- The third facet of learning is the study of the impact of peacebuilding activities in 
the recipient country. 
+ Did the project have an effect on peacebuilding in the country? What was it? Is it a 
localized or general effect? Is it short term or is it expected fo develop in the long 
term? 
+ An organization must always consider the unintended consequences of its actions. 
These can be extremely revealing of the success or failure of a given program. Did 
. the project have any unintended impact on local reality? 
D- The fourth part of the process involves asking if the goals, objectives~ activities and 
resources of the program were changed by evolving circumstances and unintended 
consequences. 
+ The exceedingly fluid nature of many peacebuilding situations makes this a critical 
question here. In seeking lessons learned,. every agency should be constantly 
questioning whether its programs are in need of modification or redefinition. 
74 
• Even if no modifications were made, one can ask whether the organization should have changed its programs and how. 
E- The fifth aspect is to estimate if the organization as a whole, and not just some of its 
programs, is being affected by peacebuilding-related activities. 
+ Were there changes in personnel outlook, in operational and managerial processes, 
in organizational culture, in non-peacebuilding programs that may have been a result 
of engaging in peacebuilding? 
+ Too often, learning is only about program and project evaluation and fails to 
consider if a specific type of activity influences the organization as a whole. 
Registering these gradual and unintended changes to an organization may be 
difficult and may take time, but can be revealing about the consequences of 
peacebuilding. . 
F- The sixth facet is to exchange and compare the lessons learned by one organization 
to the lessons gathered by other organizations involved in peacebuilding. 
+ The CPCC process is being specifically designed to do this. Other venues should 
also be used for comparison and discussion: for example, the annual Government-
NGO Peacebuildirig Consultations, meetings with representatives of donors such as 
CIDA and private foundations, learned conferences involving academics and 




The data collection for a thorough lessons-foamed process can be long and difficult. 
Ideally, it would involve: 
• the consultation of written material prepared by the organization, its partners and 
sponsors (projects, plans, budgets, evaluation reports, etc.); 
• the use of quantitative indicators to assess impact and reach of the program (number 
of people touched by activities, etc.); 
• the conduct of interviews with the organization's principals, and also with partners, 
recipients, and sponsors; 
• interviews with observers of the project, such as fellow peacebuilding workers, 
journalists, government official~, academics, etc.; 
• the consultation of externally written sources dealing. with the actions of the 
organization and the context of its efforts (newspaper articles, learned publications, 
governmental reports, etc.). 
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CHECKLIST FOR THE CPCC LESSONS-LEARNED PROJECT PROCESS 
1) Establish contact with the NGO 
Phone the official(s) in charge of the project. If possible, meet with them; 
Explain purpose of project; . 
Make clear that this is not an evaluation, so they can speak without fear of 
repercussions; 
Make it clear that NGO involvement in the project will involve answering 
questions; making written material available; helping organize a mission; 
reviewing drafts of report; etc., but that their contribution will not require an 
excessive contribution of time and resources; 
Send CPCC document, short resume, methodology document, if requested. 
2) Gather literature 
General sources on PB in the country; 
Original project application; 
Interim reports; 
Evaluations by internal or external people; 
External sources on project such as.newspaper clippings; learned articles, etc. 
3) Read and analyze literature 
Identify objectives of project; 
List results and impacts; 
Prepare questions for interviews and topics for roundtables. 
4) Interview main Canadian official(s) of the NGO 
Pass general CPCC questionnaire to official(s) if you have not done so, and· 
ask them to put down a few answers on paper, or to start thinking .about 
answers; 
Face to face interview with at least one manager; 
For interview, use general CPCC questionnaire, and this documerJ.t; 
Complement the interview with phone conversations after, when needed; 
A discussion group with a few organization officials is also possible; 
Start preparing the mission as the interviews are taking place. 
5) Prepare mission 
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Brief the consultant or graduate student in charge of the mission (if 
applicable); 
Request that NGO officials in Canada ask request their filed representative to 
arrange meetings with partners, beneficiaries, sponsors, other NGOs, 
observers, etc.; 
From Canada, contact local representatives to introduce yourself and to make 
sure that all arrangements are clear; 
Phone or write to local scholars and experts to request their cooperation and 
send them copies of CPCC documentation, short resume, methodology 
document, NGO main documents. 
5) Execute field trip 
Interview NGO's field representative; 
Organize individual interviews with some partners and I or discussion groups 
with a few of them; 
Organize a roundtable with different NGOs involved in the same field of 
action;. 
Meet the scholar or the expert who will work with CPCC on this. 
6) Debrief with Canadian NGO official 
Meet the official, or phone him I her. 
7) Write report 
Iriclude reports from correspondents in the field, if needed. 
8) Submit report to Canadian NGO official 
9) Edit report and submit to CPCC 
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Comite Coordon'nateur Canadien pour la Consolidation de la Paix (CCCCP) 
. ' . 
Lec;ons Apprises - Guatemala 
LA. MEDIATION COMME ELEMENT DE·TR.ANSMISSION DES VALEURS 
CIVIQUES ET DEMOCRA TIQUES 
{la mediacion como _elemento transmisor de valor.es dvicos y democratici:Js) 
par 
Francisco-Jose Valiente 
Jean-Franc;ois Rioux (supervision) 
Etude de cas du projet du 
Centro de Analisis y Propuestas para el Desarrollo Democratico (CAPD) 
du 
Octobre 2000 
. I- LE PROJET 
Centro para ia Accion Legal en Derechos Humanos 
(CAL DH) 
. execute a l'interieur du programme du 
Fonds pour le Developpement Democratique 
(FDD) 
du 
Centre Canadien ·d'Etude et de Cooperation Internationale 
(CECI) 
2 
A- Objet du projet 
Dans le cadre des interventions du Fonds pour le developpement de la democratie au 
Guatemala (Fondo de Desarollo Democratico - FDD), l'objet du projet sur " La mediation 
comme element de transmission des valeurs civiques et democratiques " consiste a approfondir 
!'analyse du processus de formation en negociation et resolution de conflit au Guatemala 
notamment dans la region de Solak~. aupres des representants indigenes locaux. L'implication 
du CECI au projet debuta en 1996. 
L'objet precis du projet consiste ·a former le.s autorites municipales et indigenes des 
municipalites situees a l'interieur du Departement de Sciola a de nouveaux processus de 
negociation et de mediation. L'objectif est de presenter aux autorites municipales et aux 
representants indigenes de Sciola,' de Santa Catarina lxtahuacan et de San Lucas Taliman des 
voix alternatives de negociation et de mediation pour que celles-ci puissant mener a bien la 
reconstruction de leur tissu social. Un tissu social propre aux communautes locales grace a 
!'emancipation des valeurs locales. Le tout en vue d'appuyer le " projet national de construction 
de la culture de la pa ix ". 
8- Contexte de consolidation de la paix au Guatemala 
Apres 36 ans de guerre civile (la plus tongue en Amerique latine), 200 000 morts (tant du 
cote des forces politiques que dans !'ensemble de la societe), 40 000 disparus, 100 000 refugies 
au Mexique et 1 million de deplaces a l'interieur du pays 
1
, l'histoire politique du Guatemala nous montre que l'autorite (le concept et son exercice) 
s'est imposee de fa9on violente dans ce pays. A travers les dictatures et les gouvernements 
militaires qui se sont succede aux commandes de l'Etat jusqu'en 1985, un seul acteur - l'armee 
- a maintenu une presence permanente sur la scene politique et implante le joug d'un systeme 
economique et social fonde sur !'exclusion. 
Une bonne partie du conflit tourne autour de la question agraire. La guerrilla, representee 
par la Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG), s'oppose ainsi a une petite 
oligarchie qui depuis toujours controle les meilleures terres au detriment de la majorite indigene. 
1 Chiffres: ARMON et al., Guatemala 1983-1997, t.Hacia donde va la transicidn?, Guatemala, FLACSO, 1998, p.23 
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Des l'origine, l'Etat guatemalteque a favorise la concentration des ressources et des biens entre 
les mains des elites " ladinas ", et les rapports sociaux se sent fondes sur la marginalisation et 
!'exclusion des peuples autochtones face aux decisions publiques. Expropries de leurs terres a 
la fin du 19eme siecle et accules a vivre dans des fon~ts incultes, les peuples autochtones ont ete 
. soumis au travail force de fac;on systematique. 
Des lors, comment creer un Etat ouvert a la participation de la societe civile quand, des 
l'origine, ii a eu pour fonction principale d'approvisionner les grands proprietaires 
agroexportateurs en main-d'ceuvre bon marche en utilisant des moyens qui n'ont rien a voir 
avec l'economie? En fait, plus encore que les partis politiques ou le secteur prive, c'est 
!'institution militaire qui a mis en marche l'importante affaire du marche d'exportation. Aussi, 
pour dejouer guerilla, l'armee guatemalteque a utilise des precedes devastateurs. Elle a non 
seulement impose le pouvoir militaire dans toutes les regions ou s'etendait le conflit arme, mais 
egalement desarticule les formes d'organisation communautaire et de resolution de conflit que 
les villages s'etaient donnes. 
Les campagnes menees par les forces militaires au cours des annees quatre-vingt 
centre les milices insurrectionnelles ont par la suite intensifiee les causes du conflit. D'un cote. le 
deplacement de couches entieres de populations (agricoles et indigenes) a eu pour effet 
d'accentuer le probleme de terres (partage de celles-ci et reintegration des deplaces et anciens 
combattants). D'un autre cote, le concept de democratie atteignit son niveau le plus bas avec 
. . 
l'arrivee des representants militaires a· la tete de l'Etat. Ces derniers ne permettant presque 
aucune forme d'opposition ni de reunion a cet effet. En plus, c'est lors de cette periode que 
l'Etat de droit devint quasi inexistant et que l'on vit une forte concentration du pouvoir entre 
quelques representants militaires. 
La suspension definitive des operations militaires .et offensives eurent lieu le 20 mars 
1996. Suivirent, les accords . sur le cessez-le-feu definitif · signes entre le gouvernement 
guatemalteque et l'URNG a Oslo .le 4 decembre 1996 desquels 3 000 rebelles rendirent les 
arines. Ces accords de paix porterent prinCipalenient sur la repartition des terres agricoles; la 
sante et !'education. En vue de l'accord final les parties accepterent, en mai 1996 : 
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1- le principe d'une " modernisation agraire " qui prevoit la creation d'un fonds destine a 
repartir les terres au profit des travailleLJrS agricoles et a leur faciliter l'acces au credit bancaire;. 
-2-
l'etablissement de nouvelles. normes sociales permettant !'identification des veritables 
proprietaires terriens et la correction d'abus (notamment aupres des travailleurs); 
-3-
!'augmentation significative des impots sur les terres en friche afin d'obliger les 
proprietaires a les travailler au a les revendre en vue de les redistribuer aux travailleurs 
agricoles. 
Outre le gouvernement du Guatemala, alors sous la presidence d'Alvaro Arzu Irigoyen, 
et la Unidad Revo/ucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG), les autres principaux acteurs aux 
negociations de paix furent la Mission de verification des Nations unies au Guatemala 
(MINUGUA) et " Les amis du Guatemala " dans lesquels on trouvait la Colombie, l'Espagne, les 
Etats-Unis, le Mexique, la Norvege et le Venezuela. Ces derniers apportere_nt surtout un appui 
financier et " international " aux accords de paix. 
C- Objectifs et acteurs au projet 
L'objectif du projet intitule " La mediation comme element de transmission des valeurs 
civiques et democratiques " tot elabore en un premier temps en vue de coordonner les capacites 
de developpement municipal a San Lucas Taliman. Dans le cas de Santa Catarina de 
lxtahuacan, l'objectif consistait a renforcer la representation municipals (maire et conseillers) et 
!es pouvoirs qui lui sent afferents. Mais l'objectif premier reste le renforcement du Conseil Local 
de Mediation du Departement de Sciola (qui compte les municipalites de Sciola, de Santa 
Catarina lxtahuacan et de San Lucas Taliman). 
Les objectifs premiers du projet consistent done a : 
• Doter les mairies (maires et conseillers) des moyens necessaires en vue d'apporter une 
certaine cohesion au niveau du pouvoir local municipal et rehausser le role des maires 
auxiliaires. Les maires auxiliaires on le statut " d'autorites locales " et sent elus ou nommes par 
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. la population. Ceux-ci " font le pont " entre ·la population locale et 'l'autorite municipale (tout 
comine aupres des autorites indigenes). 
• lntervenir et resoudre les conflits se posant au cceur des municipalites (ou a l'interieur du 
pouvoir municipal). Ces conflits vont du manque de representativit~ (exclusion) de certaines 
couches d'electeurs a la protection des droit~ des populations locales (droit de possession de 
leur terres et de I' exploitation de 'celle-ci) en passant par la reint~gration des deplaces (deplac~s 
a cause du conflit ou des effets de l'ouragan Mitch) et !'amelioration des conditions de vie de 
I' ensemble de la population. 
• Systematiser et rerydre public les resultats des negociations entreprises a travers ce projet. 
Pour· ce faire, le Centre Canadien d'Etude et de Cooperation Internationale (CECI) est 
pourvu d'un Programme d'Assistance Technique (PAT) au Guatemala mene par le Centro de 
Analisis y Propuestas para ei Desarollo Democratico (CAPO) 
2 du Centro para la Accion Legal en Derechos Humanos (CALDH)3. Ce projet mene par 
CAPO/CALOH se trouve a etre finance et appyye par le Fondo de Desarollo Democratico (FOO) 
du CECI au Guatemala4. 
. . 
Ainsi, !'implication du. CALDH debuta en 1994-95 alors qu'elle participait a titre d'ONG 
• • > • ' • 
dans le processus electoral afin de promouvoir davantage les droits civiques et politiques des 
. ' 
citoyens. La fagori la plus convenable de le faire consista a creer des espaces de discussion 
politiques a l'interieur desquels on put abondamment traiter des droits de la personne. 
La participation c1v1que du CALOH ne s'inscrit pas a l'interieur d'un parti ·politique. 
CALOH poursuit ses ·propres objectifs dans le cadre des lois exista~tes. Le Centro de Ana/isis y. 
Propuestas para el Desarol/o Democratico (CAPO) fut alors cree. L'objectif consista a 
2 CALDH a etabli le Centro de Analisis V Propuestas para el Desaro/lo Democratico {CAPO), qui s'occupe de promouvoir les droits 
civils et politiques des habitants des localites rurales et d'aider au renforcement ·des appareils municipaux. Dans ce sens, un des buts 
de CAPO est de renforcer la representativite du pouvoir municipal local. Ceci via une recherche et une promotion continuelle d'un 
consensus politique a 1interieur meme du pouvoir municipal {entre les maires, ·1es conseillers municipaux et la population locale). · 
3 CALDH pen;oit [les acteurs de] la societe civile comme !'element majeur pour que la democratie puisse continuer a se developper 
dans le pays et pour que Jes objectifs decoulant de la signature des accords d,e paix puissent amplement se realiser. La societe civile 
servant lei d~nterlocuteur et de contrepartie a l'autorite gouvernementale (a l'Etat). Ceci explique la volonte qu'a CALDH de former et 
de Creer et de renforcer les pouvoirS locaux Civils a l'interieur des instances .municipales (maires, conseillers, groupes de 
consultations, etc.). Ces pouvoirs et leaders locaux devront effectivement exister en vue .de representer la population locale et de 
repondre a ses besoins. . . 
~ Selon les informations fournies par le CECI, le FDD dispose de quelques 7,5 millions de$ Can pour !'ensemble de ses projets. Fonds 
fournis par l'ACDI. 
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accompagner (former et appuyer) les trois municipalites de la region de Solola (Solola, San 
Lucas Toliman y Santa Catarina de lxtahuacan) afin de faire la promotion des droits civiques et 
politiques des citoyens qui y vivent. 
Les resultats furent concluants dans le.s deux premieres localites. CAPD/CALDH arriva a 
leur enseigner (voire meme inQulquer) Jes dive.rs elements relies a la participation politique. Ce 
projet a permit la formation de leaders communautaires (hommes et femmes), a l'interieur meme 
des populations locales, capables d'intervenir a titre de representants sociaux et politiques pour 
le developpement de leurs propres communautes. De par sa participation, les deux objectifs 
poursuivis par le CECI etaient : 
1) de fournir un accompagnement technique (fournir des methodes de travail et de 
negociation, tel que la creation de seminaires de discussion, en vue de resoudre les conflits); 
2) de provoquer l'ouverture d'espaces politiques pour en arriver a un " pacte de 
gouvernance " 
5 (pacto de gobernabilidad). 
Quant au projet vise, celui-ci debuta avant meme la collaboration de CALDH avec le 
CECI. On peut neanmoins formellement dire que le projet intitule " La mediation comme element 
dE;! transmission des valeurs civiques et democratique~ " debuta dans la municipalite de San 
Lucas Toliman en 1998. Celui;.ci s'etendit en 1999 a trois municipalites du departement de 
Solola (San Lucas Toliman, Santa Catarina lxtahuacan y Solola). Au cours de l'annee 2000, le 
projet se deploya a !'ensemble du departement de Solola ceuvrant avec divers acteurs de la 
societe civile a l'interieur de 14 municipalites differentes de Solola via la AsociaCi6n Sololateca 
Unida para el Desarro/lo (ASUDI). On peut done voir a quel point ce projet a gagne en credibilite 
5 Le pacte de gouvernance (ou pacto de gobemabilidad) fut presente par. le nouveau gouvernernent Portillo aux differents maires du 
Guatemala le 24 janvier 2000. Suite a un engagement electoral, le gouvernement d'Alfonso Portillo entendit proposer un pacte ayant 
pour but de trouver et d'etablir un consensus national entre Jes representants legitimes de l'Etat (le gouvernement 
democratiquement elu) et !'ensemble des representants et leaders politlques et soclaux (rnaires, chefs syndlcaux, representants 
d'ONG, etc.). Les bases du consensus national devront etre etablies sur les ·points suivants : 
la securite du citoyen (assurer l'integrite physique et morale de l'individu); 
la justice (etablir un systerne de justice convenable avec des gens - juges - converiablement form~s); 
une demilitarisation du systeme a J'echelle nationale; 
Jes droits de la personne; 
la decentralisation du processus de decision; 
un developpement rural; 
le developpement et l'accessibilite a un systeme d'education adequat; 
l'acces pour tout citoyen au processus politique national; 
la creation d'un pacte fiscal. 
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et en repercussions. A titre de projet pilote, ii est devenu une reference importante capable 
d'aider la formation de " composantes sociales organisees " (groupes ou ONG locales, groupes 
de pressions, etc.) favorisant la decentralisation du proCe$sus de decision tel que stipule par le 
gouvernement dans son pacto de gobernabilidad. 
L'interet du CECI portait sur l'ouverture de divers mecanisnies locaux encourageant la . 
participation civile au ·processus politique local. S'il y eut collaboration avec le CECI c'etait pour 
que ce dernier donne un appui technique et financier. Cette collaboration s'etablira sur des 
themes tel que : 
• L'inclusion a la vie sociale et communautaire guatemalteque des villages et populations 
traditionnellement marginalises (femmes, enfants, personnes agees). Une inclusion selon des 
approches participatives tel que la creation d'espaces de travail et de discussion au sein des 
mairies incluant les marginalises. Ceux-ci ont ainsi !'occasion d'exposer leurs situations et leurs 
necessites face aux leaders et representants communautaires. Le tout aura comme 
consequence de leur assurer une presence au sein des organes municipaux de decision et de 
forger leur presence au cc:eur de la societe civile (ils deviennent ainsi conseillers, maires 
auxiliaires ou autres). 
• · L'etablissement de programmes d'action (commissions d'~tudes sur la participation des 
habitants lors des divers processus 'electoraux, acces de ceux-ci au' processus de prise de 
decision). 
L'implication de CALDH se fit done en fonction de la rehabilitation du tissu social et des 
valeurs civiques et ethiques (comme par exemple, la promotion du droit ·de partictpation au 
processus electoral) et ce grace aux processus de negociation et la resolution de conflits. II 
s'agit pour CALDH de creer des espaces de consultation (via des seminaires et forums 
regionaux). Des espaces .de consultation entre les representants locaux (municipaux) et les 
autorites gouvernementales, pour assurer une meilleure participation du citoyen au processus 
de decision national, et entre les communautes .locales elles-memes en vue d'apaiser les 
tensions existant entre elles (voir cas de Santa Catarina et Nahual~). Grace aussi a une entente 
negociee avec les autorites gouvernementales locales. 
D- Le cas de Santa Catarina 
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Le cas de Santa Catarina est un element important a 1~ensemble du projet. Celui-ci est 
egalement particulier car ii pose la question d'un partage geographique auquel ont du s'adapter 
deux municipalites : Santa Catarina et Nahuala. Le probleme de base repose . sur la 
relocalisation de la ville de Santa Catarina qui a du etre deplacee suite aux ravages provoques 
par l'ouragan Mitch. La relocalisation de Santa Catarina pose done les problemes : 
• de partage de territoire avec la municipalite voisine de Nahuala (situation de conflit); 
• de relocaJisation et de reamenagement des citoyens de " l'ancienne " Santa Catarina dans 
des terres appropriees et dans des conditions de vies acceptables; 
• d'identite sur la question du siege municipal (l'autorite) de la ville de Santa Catarina (conflits 
entre ceux qui sont restees dans " l'ancienne " et qui veulent preserver le siege de la 
municipalite a l'endroit original et ceux qui sont partis creer " la nouvelle " et qui y revendiquent 
le siege de l'autorite de la ville de Santa Catarina. 
L'objectif de CALDH dans le dossier de Santa Catarina fOt de fournir un appui et un 
accompagnement a la " mairie indigene " (a/ca/dia indigena). Celle-Ci se trouve a jouer un role 
de conseiller municipal (pourvue d'auxiliaires municipaux) oriente vers les demandes et 
necessites de la population locale majoritairement indigene. 
Comme resultat final, Santa Catarina parvint a recuperer une partie du territoire dispute 
avec Nahuala (en vue d'y etablir sa nouvelle municipalite ainsi que son nouveau _siege 
municipal) en contrepartie d'une reconnaissance formelle et officielle de la municipalite de 
Nuahala (qui n'etait pas ace jour acquise). 
Le CECI joua un role important da.ns le cas de Santa Catarina. Les actions du CECI 
permirent l'ouverture d'espaces de discussion et de negociation qui permirent d'avancer sur des 
themes tel que le partage des terres, la participation des femmes aux echelons de decision et la 
creation d'infrastructures sociales. 
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E- Methodologie employee 
Une des principales questions a l'interieur de ce projet se pose quant a la fac;on de 
. former les gens et de les rendre aptes au processus de negociation. La reponse repose dans 
l'etude des facteurs et themes relies a la culture locale. Mais bien qu'il faut former les gens aux 
processus de negociation; ceux-ci doivent neanmoins integrer eux-memes ces niethodes a leurs . 
modes de vie. La mise en pratique passe par la creation de conseils locaux de mediation. Done, 
une fois les tensions et conflits dissous, on passa de l'etape initiale de formation a celle de la 
mediation entre. parties opposees. 
En ce sens, divers ateliers sur le theme de la consolidation de la paix post-conflit furent 
offerts et appliques par le FDD a plus de 30 ONG locales. CAPD/CALDH pris en charge les 
questions relevant de la negociation et de la resolution de conflits. Le CECI agit dans tout 9a 
comme or'gane de supervision, d'appui et de formation. 
La methodologie privilegie au cours de ce projet repose sur les principes de negociation . 
et de resolution tel que propose par le Harvard Negotiation Project. Appliquee a l'interieur des 
communautes indigenes de la region de Solola, cette methodologie s'est aven9e etre tres 
compatible avec les coutumes appartenant au droit Maya qui se fondent normalement sur le 
respect des interets de t()utes Jes parties et l'etablissement d'accords concrets entre parties 
opposees . 
. Le Conseil de Mediation Local (CML} oriente ses activites sur trois directions: 
1} Con solider une autorite locale (un pouvoir decisionnel) propre au diverses muni~ipalites, 
regissant la vie des populations. 
2) Resoudre les conflits. 
3) Appuy.er le developpement local (donner un elan aux structures sociales} afin 
d'empecher un retour aux situations de conflit. 
Dans le cas de Santa Catarina lxtahuacan, les objectifs sont: 
10 
1) D'appuyer les autorites municipales pour le developpement de la nouvelle communaute 
de Chiupatan (la nouvelle Santa Catarina, egalement appelee Alaska). 
2) Lancer et ouvrir les pourparlers avec la municipalite de Nahuala (localite voisine a la 
nouvelle Santa Catarina) en vue de resoudre les conflits internes (conflits entre ces deux 
municipalites). 
3) Proposer et developper des methodes propres a la resolution de conflits. 
11- LEQONS APPRISES 
A- Le cas ASEDSA a San Lucas Taliman 
Les principaux liens de collaboration existant entre le groupe ASEDSA (Asociacion para 
la Economia y el Desarol/o Social Autosostenible), un regroupement cooperatif local de la 
municipalite de San Lucas Taliman qui a pour but de regrouper les demandes et besoins de la 
population locales pour que celles-ci prennent voie a travers les leaders locaux, et le projet du 
CECI, ici mene par CAPD/CALDH, se forgent a travers la discussion et la consultation. Les 
impressions d'ASEDSA sur le projet sont positives. Selon Jorge Tzunun, coordonateur 
d'ASEDSA, le projet, tel que mene par CAPD/CALDH, leur a, a ce jour, permit de mieux 
communiquer localement entre eux. A l'interieur de la communaute de San Lucas et avec 
!'ensemble des autorites municipales du Departement de Solola. 
Le travail effectue par ASEDSA repose sur quatre piliers : 
1- · developper !'education (scolarisation); 
2- viser l'egalite des sexes et favoriser la participation de la femmes dans Jes divers 
secteurs de la societe (agraire dans ce cas-ci); 
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3- viser une meilleure repartition des terres agricoles; . 
4- renforcer et consolider le pouvoir local. 
CAPD/CALDH appuya ASEDSA dans sa demarche lui permettant ainsi de devenir un 
· organe de coordination important. Un point de reference entre les leaders locaux. 
(particullerement a Sari. Lucas). Ceci permit un developpement social plus pousse (education, 
exercice civil par .les citoyens, renforcement de l'autorite municipale locale) ainsi qu'une 
meilleure gestion des ressources municipales. 
En matiere de " le9ons apprises ", ce qu'ASEDSA retient de l'implication du 
CAPD/CALDH c'est leur apport en matiere de formation· (particulierement sur le theme de la 
prevention des conflits). ASEDSA affirme que la population connait bien les solutions aux 
problemes locaux. Le. seul probleme c'est · qu'elle n'a pas les outils appropries pour les 
appliquer. Au cceur des litiges locaux : !'augmentation salariale des paysans travaillant la terre et 
les relations difficiles entre ces memes paysans et les proprietaires terriens. 
Dedies a la promotion du dialogue entre parties opposees, encourageant, a titre de 
leaders communautaire, les voies non-violentes et pacifiques, ASEDSA adopta les modes de 
consultation populaire proposes par CAPD/CALDH. Selan ASEDSA, ces modes de consultation 
permirent de renforcer le leadership local des representants municipaux. Mais !'element le plus 
significatif que !'on dojt encore aujourd'hui aux consultations fut qu'elles donnerent lieu a la 
creation d'espaces de discussion entre paysans et proprietaires terrien. Espaces qu~aucune des 
deux parties ne croyait a ce jour possible. Resultat des discussions : les proprietaires terrien ont 
fini par accepter que les paysans se dotent eux-memes de leur propres terres (qu'ils pourraient 
habiter et cultiver). Le tout sans en arriver a une situation de violence. On peut done affirmer 
que les paysans ont aujourd'hui davantage de possibilites de s'emanciper socialement 
(scolarite, droits sociaux, capacites de negocier leurs conditions de travail, etc.) .. 
~a collaboration CALDH et ASEDSA permit egal.ement de renforcer les liens entre les 
leaders. des communautes du Departement de Solola, eu pour effet d'ameliorer la securite civile 
a l'interieur des municipalites. 
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Enfin, en vue de renforcer les espaces sociaux dans lesquels pourraient davantage 
participer les citoyens, CAPD/CALDH rehabilita et donna, a partir de 1997, plus de pouvoir aux 
maires auxiliaires. L'objectif fut d'elargir le pouvoir aux differentes spheres sociales (vision 
horizontale du pouvoir) en vue de faire participer !'ensemble de la population aux enjeux !es plus 
nevralgiques de la communaute, tels que !'education et l'accessibilite au sources et points 
d'eau. Le but consistait ·avant tout a voir a ce que !'information soit dument retransmise, 
notamment en matiere de fiscalite et de.gouvernance (dans ces deux cas via la negociation des 
pactes et ententes nationales) ainsi qu'en matiere de developpement (strategies a adopter pour 
un developpement economique local, techniques, dialogues et negociations). 
B- Le cas de Santa Catarina de Chiupatan 
Bien que l'on ai finit par donner le titre de siege municipal a la " nouvelle " Santa Catarina 
(Chiupatan), plusieurs problemes subsistent quant a !'implantation de cette municipalite dans 
son actuelle location geographique. Ces problemes vont : 
• de !'opposition existant entre ceux qui n'ont pas voulu quitter l'ancienne localite de Santa 
Catarina (lxtahuacan) et ceux qui sont venus fonder la " nouvelle ", entralnant ainsi un manque 
de cohesion et de cooperation entre I' ensemble des .habitants (sentiment .d'hero"isme chez ceux 
qui sont partis s'installer dans la nouvelle localite denigrant ceux qui sont restes " en bas "; ces 
derniers ne voulant pas, a leur tour.cooperer avec ceux qu'ils prennent pour des" fous "); 
• de la rivalite existant entre les habitants de cette nouvelle Santa Catarina et leurs voisins de 
la municipalite de Nahuala.a qui on a ampute une partie de leur territoire en contrepartie d'une . 
reconnaissance officielle (des affrontements entre villageois de Nahuala et Santa Catarina ont 
provoque la mort de deux personnes et une quarantaine de blesses); 
• des mauvaises conditions de vie auxquelles sont confrontes les deplaces dans ce nouveau 
territoire (qui doivent affronter, entre autres, la poussiere, le froid et le manque d'eau). 
a) Le<;ons apprises par /es autorites municipa/es de la "nouvelle " Santa Catarina 
Pour arriver a un accord avec la municipalite voisine de Nahuala, les autorites 
municipales de la " nouvelle " Santa Catarina ont du se rendre a !'evidence qu'il fallait affronter 
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et regler les problemes suivants afin qu'un plan regional soit communement propose, permettant 
aux habitants des deux municipalites de vivre en paix : 
• Eliminer les formes de desinformation ainsi que le manque de communication entre les deux 
localites (eviter les susceptibilites). 
• Travailler ensemble afin de developper de meilleures conditions sanitaires pour les habitants 
de la " nouvelle " Santa Catarina, constamment confrontes au probleme de la poussiere (terre 
tres granuleuse facilement eparpillee par le vent et qui affecte les voies respiratoires). 
• Regler par transport routier le manque d'eau tout en la gardant potable. 
• Allouer de plus grands espaces agricoles aux habitants de la " nouvelle " Santa Catarina afin 
qu'ils puissent mieux s'alimenter. 
• Remover ou reconsfruire la route qui va de l'ancienne (en bas) a la nouvelle (en haut) 
municipalite de Santa Catarina afin que le demenagement des villageois soit mains perilleux et 
qu'ils puissent continuer a cultiver certaines de leurs terres qui se trouvent encore" en bas". 
L'implication du CAPD/CALDH se fit done dans la creation de seminaires de discussion 
. . 
entre villageois de Santa Catarina, dans lesquels les perceptions negatives sur leurs voisins de 
Nahuala furent presentees et debattues. Les conclusions des discussions menerent souvent a 
la prises en compte que ces derniers vivaient comme eux, qu'ils devaient en grande partie 
affronter les memes problemes qu'eux et qu'ils n'etaient done pas si differents. M~me si le 
probleme de zonage rural entre les deux communautes restait (et reste encore aujourd'hui) 
evident et persistant. 
Le meme exercice tut propose et effectue communement entre autorites municipales et 
villageois de Santa Catarina et de Nahuala. Les resultats ne furent pas tous positifs. Des 
mesententes persistent toujours, mais l'objectif de creer des espaces de communication, de 
negociation et d'information a ete atteint. Grace aux efforts entrepris par CAPD/CALDH et grace 
aux travaux effectues par la Commission de Transfert (Comision de Traslado) mandatee par le 
gouvernement central,_des espaces democratiques ont ete crees et etablis. Des espaces qui ont 
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permit de consolider la paix au sein de la communaute, grace a !'implantation d'un equilibre 
social base sur des valeurs ethiques, de respect et de justice entre villageois. Aussi, et de fa9on 
plus precise, CALDH a egalement aide a etablir des contacts directs avec la MINUGUA tout en 
attirant I' attention de la presse sur le cas de Santa Catarina (voir article). 
a) Legons apprises par Jes membres du Comite de Transfert de Santa Catarina 
Selan les membres du Comite de Transfert de Santa Catarina 
6
, l'apport du CALDH a la resolution des conflits est evident. Ceux-ci ne se genent pas 
pour affirmer que !es ateliers de discussion, desquels de meilleures perceptions des habitants 
de Nahuala s'en sont degages, ant aide a la consolidation de la paix en region. Ces ateliers 
firent realiser aux villageois que Jes populations de la region, a commencer par eux, n'etaient 
aucunement pourvues d'un caractere violent et que c'etait a eux, indigenes" marginalises", que 
revenait le merite d'avoir entrepris les demarches en vue de demenager vers de meilleures 
terres. 
De fac;on plus technique, les ateliers offerts par CALDH ont permit aux membres du 
Comite de devenir familier avec de nouvelles methodes participatives. Methodes qui leur ont 
enseigne les rouages du travail en equipe, de la coordination ainsi que le role a jouer en tant 
qu'individus impliques a l'interieur d'une organisation locale (le Comite de transfert). Que vont-ils 
y apporter a titre de villageois soumis a de penibles conditions de vie ? Comment, a titre 
d'individus, vont-ils participer a l'instauration de meilleures relations avec la municipalite voisine 
de Nahuala? 
En conclusion, ce tut dans les moments les plus difficiles que !'implication du CALDH fut 
plus motivante. Les outils fournis par le projet intitule " La mediation comme element de 
transmission des valeurs civiques et democratiques " mena : 
• aux negociations de zonage rural et au partage des terres (mesures de celles-ci); 
6 Le Comite de Transfert de Santa Catarina est un groupe cree ad hoc par Jes villageois deplaces dans la nouvelle Sana ta Catarina et 
enterine par le maire et conseil municipal de la nouvelle localite. Celui-ci se compose de villageois qui se sont respectivement portes 
volontaires en vue de traiter et de trouver un solution aux divers problemes d'eau, d'electricite, de transport routier, des relations 
avec !es communautes voisines, etc. Chaque membre du comite de transfert est responsable de l'un de ces enjeux et doit le mener a 
bien. 
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• a l'etablissement d'un lien permanent de consultation entre le Comite de Transfert et les 
villageois qu'il represente (ces derniers lui donnant toute legitimite d'action); 
• a traiter ensemble (entre representants de Santa Catarina et de Nahuala et entre hommes et 
femmes) Jes problemes communs (sante, eau, terres et mouvements de populations). 
Mentionnons enfin que !'amelioration et la promotion du statut de la femme constituait un 
des points majeurs au developpement des local de Santa Catarina lxtahuacan. Dans ce cas-ci, 
ii a ete important de les integrer et de les former pour qu'elles participent a part entiere a trouver 
', ' 
des solutions aux problemes existant dans cette localite. En ce sens, elles sent en grande partie 
responsables de l'acheminement de l'eau potable dans la municipalite. Constituant aujourd'hui 
une couche principale du developpement local, les femmes ont notamment reussi a gagner leur 
place sans trap avoir suscite des reactions negatives de la part des hommes. Grande partie du 
travail de consultation offert par CAPD/CALDH consistait done a sensibiliser les hommes aux 
rotes que devaient jouer les femmes. 
111- CONCLUSION : LEc;ONS RETENUES PAR LE CECI 
De fa9on generale, !es trois municipalites de la region de Solola (Solola, San Lucas 
Taliman y Santa Catarina de lxtahuacan) ont ace jour bien-profite du projet. Tel que mentionne, 
les resultats furent concluants dans !es deux premieres localites. CAPD/CALDH .arriva a leur 
enseigner les elements relies a la participation ,politique : tel que le droit a la libre expression 
(valeurs reliees a la tolerance) et les droits auss_i fondamentaux comme le droit a la vie (mettre 
fin aux attentats centre la personne). Les chose furent davantage differentes a Santa Catarina. II 
fut difficile d'etablir une relation de confiance avec les autorites locales municipales. L'objectif 
restait neanmoins d'arriver a etablir un tissu social en r.ehabilitant les droits et valeurs etiques 
des populations locales. Concretement, ·on assista a l'impf antation d'une autorite et d'un conseil 
' ' 
indigene. Le processus d'accompagnement propose par CAPD/CALDH du se conformer aux 
valeurs culturelles locales. 
Aux yeux des representants du CECI au Guatemala, qui ant supervise le travail du projet 
. . ' . 
de " La m~diation comme element de transmission des valeurs civiques et democratiques ", 
CAPD/CALDH a reussi a s'etablir comme organe de consultation aupres des communautes du 
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Departement de Solola, a peu de frais et avec peu de moyens. Une des premieres lec;ons que le 
CECI y retient est la necessite pour eux de poursuivre et de developper une plus grande 
collaboration avec CAPD/CALDH sur le terrain. De toutes les organisations locales avec 
lesquelles CECI est associe, CAPD/CALDH est, selon eux, celle qui repond le mieux aux 
problemes specifies par le projet. 
Aussi, selon Jes representants du CECI, le projet donna la possibilite a CAPD/CALDH 
d'etre attentif aux autres enjeux importants se deroulant a l'interieur du departement de Solola. 
Tel fOt le cas de leur implication avec l'UDAK (voir annexe 2). C'est dire a quel point ce projet ne 
s'est pas simplement limite a accomplir ce qu'il s'etait fixe comme premiers objectifs. II adopta 
une vision strategique large d'un processus qui ne devait en aucun moment exclure d'autres 
groupes sociaux defendant une cause legitime. 
Ce qui est en grande partie acquis, c'est la creation d'un " pont " entre, d'une part, la 
consolidation de la paix et la prevention de conflits et, d'autre part, le developpement local 
(social et economique). La prevention de conflits a un niveau micro (sur des themes tel que le 
partage des terres et l'accessibilite aux sources d'eau) fut, des un premier temps, pense afin 
d'obtenir un plus grand developpement local. CAPD/CALDH a aide a activer une plate-forme 
globale entraTnant un. developpement social et communautaire. II y a done eu un developpement 
local qui s'est consolide a l'interieur des communautes de Solola, Santa Catarina et San Lucas 
Toliman. Tout comme CAPD/CALDH, les autorites municipales de ces communautes ont 
aujourd'hui en leur possession !es outils qui leur permettent de creer et d'etablir de nouveaux 
projets de developpement et meme de les faire financer. 
Autre point acquis : !'amelioration et l'avancement du statut donne aux femRles a 
l'interieur du developpement local. La promotion du statut de la femme (principalement indigene 
dans ce cas-ci) constituait un des points majeurs au developpement des communautes. Tel 
qu'on l'a mentionne dans le cadre du projet de Santa Catarina lxtahuacan, ii a ete important 
d'integrer et de former les femmes pour que celles-ci deviennent des citoyennes a part entiere 
(dans le droit et dans le devoir) pour le developpement de leur propres communautes. Pour 
autant, le fait de traiter de la condition et de la place des femmes dans le developpement local 
ne signifia en aucun cas d'exclure ou de deresponsabiliser une partie des hommes. Au 
?ontraire, ii fallut les impliquer dans ce processus car ii fallait que ces derniers soient 
sensibilises et comprennent !'importance du role que les femmes ont a jouer. Tache qui n'est 
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pas facile a accomplir .dans le cadre des cultures mayas (ou l'homme laisse peu de place a la 
femme au niveau du processus de decision). 
Quelques resultats (acquis): 
• La creation d'un processus de dialogue permanent entre les autorites municipales de Solola, 
Santa Catarina et San Lucas Taliman. 
• De plus grandes possibilites· pour certains representants .villageois (leaders locaux). 
d'occuper des postes plus importants au sein des mairies. 
• Le renforcement des organisations et institutions locales telles que la II mairie indigene " 
(a/caldia indigena). 
• Le renouvellement du role des maires auxiliaires. 
• ·Le renforcement du pouvoir des femmes dans le cadre du developpement local de leur 
propre communautes. 
• La recuperation des valeurs civiques au sein des populations. 
• La creation de nouveaux liens entre anciens et nouveaux maires en vue d'etablir de 
nouveaux agendas de consultation locales (creant ainsi de nouveaux espaces de discussion). 
• Les themes associes au " pacte de gouvernance " (pacto de gobernabilidad) sont a l'ordre 
du jour des discussions menees entre les autorites municipales et aussi avec CAPD/CALDH. 
• Le developpement qe . nouvelles strategies de travail pouv.ant mener a un · plus large · 
developpement de la r~gion. Par exemple, analyser l'impact que pourraient avoir les medias en. 
diffusant periodiquement les probleines .Propres au Departement de Solola, notamment le cas 
de Santa Catarina. II faut egalement etre a l'affOt des problemes qui se posent a l'interne. Par 
exemple, continuer a attirer !'attention des autorites municipales (notamment les maires) .aux 
problemes enorices par leurs populations. 
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• Une autre grande le9on a retenir est que bien que les conflits soient stoppes, rien n'est pour 
autant acheve. II faut maintenir un suivi (garder un reil attentif) afin de renforcer le 
developpement local. 
Quant aux le9ons apprises qui se sont, a ce jour, averees moins positives, les 
representants du CECI en retiennent particulierement trois : 
1- L'ensemble des acteurs impliques aux projets (consultants CECl/FDD, CAPD/CALDH, 
representants municipaux et beneficiaires) ont jusqu'~ maintenant du se conformer a un 
" succes sommaire " des negociations menees entre les communautes de Santa Catarina, 
Nahuala et le gouvernement. Apres la premiere phase de negociations (qui favorisa Santa 
Catarina lxtahuacan), CAPD/CALDH cru au respect des accords de la part des habitants de 
Nahuala, ainsi qu'a !'elimination de toute forme de belligerance entre les deux municipalites 
voisines. Neanmoins, on peu aujourd'hui affirmer que les representants de CAPD/CALDH n'ont 
pas assez propage et diffuse les termes des accords a l'interieur de la communaute de Nahuala. 
Aussi, lorsque les representants du gouvernement vinrent prendre les mesures territoriales afin 
de departager ce que, selon les accords, revenait a lxtahuacan, des affrontements survinrent 
entre habitants de Nahuala et de Santa Catarina lxtahuacan, provoquant marts et blesses. Ces 
altercations eurent egalement pour effet de freiner le processus de transfert des habitants vers 
la" nouvelle" Santa Catarina (deja entame) et.de rouvrir les accords au detriment des acquis de 
lxtahuacan (ils finirent par obtenir mains d'espace que prevu). Les le9ons qui sont ici a retenir 
porte done sur : · 
• la necessite de parvenir a tout moment a des accords acceptables et applicables de part et 
d'autre; 
• le fait de bien propager les conditions des accords, telles qu'elles doivent etre appliques, a 
!'ensemble des parties; 
• la necessite d'exercer une " veille " (monitoring) sur les relations entre parties opposees afin 
que celles-ci restent au beau fixe. 
• 
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2- II est bien sOr important pour CAPD/CALDH de s'integrer pleinement a la problematique 
locale, a !'ensemble des enjeux et au mode de vie de la population. qui beneficie de l'aide. Mais 
selon les representants du CECI, !'assimilation des representants " terrains " a celle-ci a 
occasionne, a quelques moments et bien malgre eux, certains retards chez les beneficiaires. La 
grande difficulte dans un tel pro jet reside dans. la capacite de respecter et de faire co"incider le 
temps d'apprentissage et de developpement de la communaute locale avec l'echeancier du 
projet. II s'agit d'y trouver une harmonie entre les deux. Selon CECI, CAPD/CALDH aurait dO 
agir de maniere plus " proactive " avec les beneficiaires en vue de les rendre plus participatifs a 
leur propre developpement local (economique et social). CAPD/CALDH doit egalement entrevoir 
et planifier une strategie de sortie car une fois dotees des outils necessaires et apres les avoir 
assimiles, les populations locales finiront par prendre en main leur propre destinee. 
3- 11 existe enfin un risque . a pousser un processus de participation et de representation 
democratique lorsque celui-ci est mene en periode de campagne electorale. Le risque est que le 
· projet soit trap identifie a un mouvement ou un parti politique. Et qui plus est que !es interets du 
projet ne convergent trop avec !es inten9ts d'un parti en particulier. Bien que l'on ne puisse 
restreindre.les opinions ou les activites politiques des individus membres des communautes qui 
beneficiaient du projet, le projet mene par CAPD/CALDH fut considers comme trap associe aux 
interets du Comites Civicos 
7
• Selon les representants du CECI, les defaites encaissees par Jes Comites Civicos aux 
elections municipales de 1999 eurent pour effet " d'user " poHtiquement le personnel du projet et 
de creer maintes desill.usions chez la population qui avait mit beaucoup d'espoirs dans la 
victoire des Comites Civicos. 
Sur une note plus generale, et pour conclure, le CECI considere que l'un.e ,Pes plus 
importante le9ons provient de la necessite pour tout projet et programme de systematiser 
(normaliser) ses travaux afin que ses impacts, procedures, forces, faiblesses et objectifs soient 
clairement mis en valeur. Afin done, que des le9ons soient en bout de ligne retenues pour que 
les memes erreurs ne soient pas repetees et pour que les memes objectifs soient de nouveau 
atteints. II est done important de laisser les traces les plus completes des projets accomplis, 
pour que ceux-ci puissent servir d'exemple a d'autres groupes et pour que les benefices 
puissent etre exportes a d'autres pays ou ceuvre la cooperation canadienne. 
7 Expressions locales organisee, regroupements ou parti politique agissant pour la defense des inten~ts des communautes 
marginalises et pour une plus grande representation politique de celles-ci. · 
ANNEXE 1 : PROGRAMME D'ENTREVUES 
• Alan Quirin, Lucrecia de Paniagua 
Fonda de desarollo democratico - CECI. 
24 janvier 2000 
• Mario Minera 
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Coordinador de Fortalecimiento del Poder Civil Local y Desarollo Democratico Centro para 
Accion Legal en Derechos Humanos (CALDH) 
24 janvier 2000 
• Jorge Tzunun 
Coordenador de la Asociacion para la Economia y el Desarollo Social Autosostenible 
(ASE;DSA) y consejal de la municipalidad de San Lucas Taliman. 
25 janvier 2000 
• Miguel Guarxas Castro 
Alcaldia lndigena de Solola. 
25 janvier 2000 
• Juan Tuyuc 
Union para el Oesarollo Alternative del Area de Kaqchike (UDAK). 
25 janvier 2000 
• Carlos Bracamontes 
Alcalde de Panajachel y autoridades municipales 
25 janvier 2000 
• Jose Tum Katinac, Cruz Tzep, Juan Soham Tahay 
Autoridades municipales de Santa Catarina lxtahuacan en Chiupatan. 
26 janvier 2000 
• Manuel Soham, Marcos Ajpakaja, Antonio Tuyuc, Pedro Garcias, Manuel Isidro 
Comisi6n de traslado de Santa Catarina Chiupatan. 
26 janvier 2000 
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ANNEXE 2: LE CAS DE L'UDAK 
CAPD/CALDH appuya egalement la ·Union para el Desarol/o A/ternativo def Area de Kaqchike 
(UDAK), groupe principalement voue a la reinsertion des anciens combattants guerrilleros a la 
. vie sociale et productive. Les principales demandes de la UDAK reposent sur l'accessibilite, 
pour les ex-combattants, aux terres de production et a la commercialisation de leurs produits. 
En ce sens, le projet CECI, mene sur le terrain par CAPD/CALDH, offrit principalement de la 
formation en matiere de negociation. L'objectif etant de renforcer le leadership des 
representants locaux, membres de la communaute. · 
L'Appui offert par CAPD/CALDH a l'UDAK a a ce jour consiste : 
• a analyser les objectifs de l'UDAK ainsi.que leur realisation au sein des communautes du 
Departement de Solola; · 
• a elaborer de nouveaux projets; 
• a faire partager les objectifs et problemes de l'UDAK avec d'autres organismes locaux. · 
· Lors de sa creation en 1997, suite a la signature des accords de paix de decembre 1996, 
l'UDAK eu comme premier objectif d'acquerir, par voie legale, le titre d'ONG locale. Apres avoir 
atteint son statut juridique d'ONG, l'objectif de la UDAK fut d'acquerir egalement une sorte de 
reconnaissance politique principalement de la part de la Mission de verification des Nations 
Unies au Guatemala (MINUGUA) et de la Secretaria de la Paz (SEPAZ). Cette reconnaissance 
politique de la part d'une OIG tel que l'ONU ou de la SEPAZ equivaudrait a accepter les anciens 
combattants guerrilleros en attente d'une integration sociale. Les · maintes fautes et erreurs 
associes au mouvement revolutionnaire national, remettaient constamment en question la 
possibilite pour ces ex-combattants de reintegrer un poste, un lieu ou une fonction a l'interieur 
de la societe. Des !ors, ne pouvant laisser ces gens a leur propre desarroi, CALDH s'interessa 
fortement a la question ainsi qu'aux efforts de l'UDAK. 
La plus grande partie du travail effectue sur le terrain par CALDH consista a mettre l'UDAK en 
contact avec d'autres organismes publiques ou prives de la region de Sciola. CALDH fournit une 
equipe technique ainsi qu'une methode precise de travail en matiere de rehabilitation. L'objectif 
du CALDH fut de comprendre et de partager la realite dans laquelle vivaient ces ex-combattants 
encore marginalises aujourd'hui. L'etude du probleme permit en un premier temps de recenser 
le nombre d'anciens combattants vivant au marge de la societe et de connaitre, dans un 
deuxieme temps, leur veritables problemes (pauvrete, aucune opportunite d'emploi, depourvus 
de terre, etc.) Ces problemes furent ensuite presentes et debattus en reunion et en ple.nieres 
face aux autres organisations du Departement. · 
L'objectif ultime consistait a demontrer a toute la nation guatemalteque le probleme · de 
marginalisation que vit cette couche d'anciens combattants demobilises et d'effectuer des 
propositions au gouvernement central en vue d'obtenir compensation. Ces propositions viserent 
a: 
1- rendre visible les ex-combattants demobilises comme une classe prete a travailler 
dans le cadre des accords de paix; 
2- aider au processus national de reconciliation ainsi qu'a !utter centre la pauvrete 
qui affecte cette classe de demobilises ainsi que leurs communautes; · 
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3- a attirer !'attention de la communaute internationale sur ce probleme en vue de 
mieux definir et developper le processus de paix et de reconciliation nationale. 
CALDH donna des cours de formation en matiere de resolution de conflits a l'UDAK. Les cours 
de formation permirent de creer des points de consensus entre l'UDAK et les beneficiaires. On 
chercha, par exemple, a etablir un statut d'egalite entre les plus demunis. A les traiter de fa9on 
egale tout en etant a l'affat de leur problemes particuliers. Le tout avait comme objectif global de 
donner une orientation, des connaissances quant a ce qui se faisait dans le cadre general du 
pays. Informer les demobilises demunis sur le processus general de paix qui avait cours dans le 
pays. Leur mentionner quels etaient leur droits politiques, a quels developpements economiques 
devaient-ils aspirer, quelle etait leur place dans cette nouvelle societe de paix et revoir un peu le 
cadre historique du pays afin de mieux comprendre toutes ces annees de guerre. 
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ANNEXE 3 : BIBLIOGRAPHIE, TEXTES CONSUL TES 
Photocopies de brochures du CECI expliquant les projets menes par le Fonds pour le 
Developpement Democratique. (etre plus explicits?) 
Guatemala : Batir la paix 
Reportage : " Si j'avais les ailes d'un ange ", realise par- Daniel Bertolino (collection Via le 
Monde). Avec Alan Quinn du Fonds de developpement democratique; 
Le Guatemala sort d'une guerre civile de 35 ans dont l'enjeu principal etait la condition des , 
autochtones, majoritaires dans leur propre pays mais absents des instances du pouvoir. Le 
Quebecois Alan Quinn et son homologue guatemalteque, Lucretia de Paniagua, appuient des 
organisations determinees a augmenter la participation des autochtones dans la vie 
democratique. Un programme vaste, aux ramifications etonnantes. 
